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EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS IN INDIANA? -
CONSIDERING THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
I. INTRODUCTION
Calls for educational reform continue to echo throughout the nation,'
sounding from social liberals and religious conservatives, presidents and
parents, politicians and pundits, educators and think tanks.2 Because
these calls come from such diverse voices, the reform proposals and
programs vary widely.3
Consider the call of the two most recent presidents. President
Clinton addressed education reform in his 1999 State of the Union
Address:
You know, our children are doing better .... But there's
a problem. While our 4th graders outperform their
peers in other countries in math and science, our 8th
graders are around average, and our 12th graders rank
near the bottom. We must do better. Now, each year
the national government invests more that $15 billion in
our public schools. I believe we must change the way
we invest that money, to support what works and to
stop supporting what does not work ....
[Later this year, I will send to Congress a plan that, for
the first time, holds states and school districts
See Jonathon B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education
Enter the "Adapt or Die" Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75
(1995); Peter J. Weishaar, School Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REv.
543 (1994); Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education Toward
Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L.
REv. 697 (1997).
2 For a discussion of American Presidents' calls for educational reform, see infra Section
lI.B.3.b. Minorities and lower-class parents yearn for a better educational system for their
children. William J. Bennett et al., A Nation Still at Risk, 90 J. AM. CrIZENSHIP: POL'Y REV.
2, 122 (July-Aug. 1998) <http://www.policyreview.com/jul98/nation.html>. However,
most of these parents lack the resources to provide their children with a quality private
education. Id. For a discussion of Indianapolis' Mayor Steven Goldsmith's assessment of
the educational system in Indianapolis, see "infra Section II.A.4. For a discussion of
numerous think tanks', pundits', and educators' approaches to improving American
schools, see infra Section ll.B.3.a.
3 For a discussion on the available "school choice" reform programs, see infra Section II.A.
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accountable for progress and rewards them for results.
My Education Accountability Act will require every
school district receiving federal help to take the
following five steps.
First, all schools must end social promotion.
But we can't just hold students back because the system
fails them. So my balanced budget triples the funding
for summer school and after-school programs, to keep a
million children learning ....
Second, all states and school districts must turn around
their worst-performing schools-or shut them down ....
Third, all states and school districts must be held
responsible for the quality of their teachers ....
Fourth, we must empower parents, with more
information and more choices. In too many
communities, it's easier to get information on the quality
of the local restaurants than on the quality of the local
schools .... And parents should be given more choices
in selecting their public schools ....
Fifth, to assure that our classrooms are truly places of
learning, and to respond to what teachers have been
asking us to do for years, we should say that all states
and school districts must both adopt and implement
sensible discipline policies ....
If we do these things-end social promotion; turn around
failing schools; build modem ones; support qualified
teachers; promote innovation, competition and
discipline - then we will begin to meet our generation's
historic responsibility to create 21st century schools.4
4 President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (visited Dec. 22, 1999)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990119-2656.html>.
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Former President George Bush also addressed educational reform
during his term as President:
We must create an incentive to improve education by
promoting school choice. For far too long, we've
shielded our schools from competition, allowed the
system a damaging monopoly power over students. Just
as monopolies are bad for the economy, they're bad for
our kids. Every parent should have the power to choose
which school is best for his child, public, private or
religious.5
Both presidents lauded the possibilities of school choice as one of the
solutions to some of the problems in the American educational system.6
These proposals, while not new, are gaining supporters throughout the
country.
Calls for educational reform resonate because of the alarm generated
by continued poor performance by American students on standardized
tests in comparison to students in other countries.7 Since 1983, over ten
5 President's Remarks to the Lehigh Valley 2000 Community, PUB. PAPERS 609, 610, 612
(Apr. 16,1992).
6 The term "school choice" refers to a parent choice of which school their children will
attend. THE SCHOOL-CHOICE CONTROVERSY: WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL? 49 (James W.
Skillen ed. 1993) [hereinafter CONTROVERSY]. The school may either be inside or outside of
the families' residential district. Id. The parents also have the ability to decide whether to
send their children to a public or private, sectarian or non-sectarian school. Id. Besides
granting parents a choice, school choice also offers numerous alternative educational
opportunities not available in the traditional public school experience. Paul E. Peterson, A
Report Card on School Choice, COMMENTARY MAG., Oct. 1997, at 15.
<http://www.commentarymagazine.com/9710/peterson.htm>. School choice will not
dismantle the 150-year-old public school system. Id. at 125. Rather, school choice will be a
gradual process, focusing on the educational institutions most in need of improvements.
Id.
7 Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 47, 47-48 (1998).
Numerous American voters are saying that their biggest concern is school choice. Thomas
Toch, Outstanding High Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 18,1999, at 46,48. Although
most statistics about the current state of the American educational system are grim, some
schools are demonstrating academic excellence. Id. U.S. News and World Report and the
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago surveyed 1,053 high
schools in metropolitan areas (Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Fort Worth, Atlanta, and
New York) searching for outstanding high schools. Id. The criteria consisted of high
attendance rates, a core college preparatory curriculum, high academic standards, highly
qualified and knowledgeable teachers, a strong mentoring program for new teachers, a
strong partnership between the school and parents, and caring and encouraging
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million American students have entered the twelfth grade without being
able to read.8 Almost twenty million American high school seniors were
unable to calculate elementary math problems, and twenty-five million
twelfth grade students could not identify significant American historical
events.9 In 1991, a study by the National Assessment of Educational
Progress showed that approximately fourteen percent of public school
eighth grade students could only perform seventh grade level
mathematics, while only seventy-two percent of public school fourth
grade students were capable of solving third grade math problems. 10
The recent Third International Math and Science Study demonstrated
that American students struggle with basic skills." The study found
that, out of twenty-one developed nations, American twelfth grade
students placed sixteenth in science, nineteenth in mathematics, and last
in physics.12 Coupled with this minimal knowledge in basic math and
science is the fact that the total number of high school drop-outs between
administrators. Id. at 49. Based on these criteria, only ninety-six schools gained
outstanding institution status. Id.
8 U.S. Taxpayers Not Getting Their Money's Worth out of Public Education, Says IPI, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 1999. According to the National Assessment of Education Progress,
between 1974 and 1991 high school students showed no improvements in math, and their
progress dropped in reading and science. Id. at 11. During this same time period,
elementary students showed minimal improvements in reading and mathematics. Id.
9 Peterson, supra note 6, at 13. In 1986, one-third of high school students did not know
that "the Declaration of Independence marked the American colonists' break from
England." Richard S. Albright, Note, Educational Voucher Statutes: Does the Rosenberger
Analysis Provide a Modern Constitutional Foundation for Legitimacy?, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
525, 532 (1997). Despite the shocking statistics demonstrating students' lack of
fundamental knowledge, the system does not punish them. Richard Rothstein, Where Is
Lake Wobegon, Anyway?, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 195 (1998). Louis Gerstner, Chief Executive
Officer of IBM, stated that "[t]oo often schools reward students merely for showing up, not
for proficiency. Because educators do not define the goals students must achieve to
advance from grade to grade, students who cannot read, write, or compute are promoted."
Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., Don't Retreat on School Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at A02. In
another setting, Sandra Feldman, president of the American Federation of Teachers,
reached the same conclusion as Gerstner. Rothstein, supra at 195. Feldman concluded that
schools are sending students to the next grade level who have not developed solid skills in
reading, writing, and arithmetic. Id. In order for students to develop these skills, Feldman
suggested more qualified teachers, intensive help to struggling children, and better
preschool programs. Id.
10 See Albright, supra note 9, at 531.
It John Leo, Hey, We're No. 19!, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 9, 1998, at 14.
12 Id.
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1983 and 1998 soared to over six million Americans.1 3 These alarming
national statistics mirror those in the state of Indiana. 14
13 See Bennett et al., supra note 2. A report released on November 23, 1998, by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, indicated that currently only
seventy-two percent of all American high school students graduate. Tamara Henry, USA
Falling Back in School; Graduation Rates Lag Europe, Asia, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1998, at 1D.
In comparison to the twenty-nine wealthiest countries surveyed, Mexico is the only country
that ranks below the United States in graduation rates. Id.
14 Indiana high school juniors have consistently performed poorly on national assessment
exams. James K. Baker, Given a Choice - Except in Educating Our Children, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Nov. 8, 1993, at A13. In 1992 and 1996, Hoosier students ranked forty-seventh
among students in the fifty states in their combined average math and verbal Scholastic
Assessment Test scores. Id. See also Susan Miller, Technical Careers at the Top of the Class,
TRIB. BUS. WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 1997, at 1. Indiana high school students' SAT scores rose a few
points in 1998, placing Indiana 42nd in national rankings. Editorial, Low SAT Scores,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 2, 1999, at A18. However, the average SAT score for 1999
graduates dropped from the scores of the 1998 graduating class. Id. Currently, Indiana is
45th in national ranking for SAT scores. Michele McNeil Solida, Indiana Results on SAT
Decline, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 1, 1999, at Al. The five states with lower average SAT
scores are South Carolina, Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Editorial,
supra at A18. Bruce W. Galbraith, Headmaster at Park Tudor, Indianapolis, stated,
"Whether we're 45th or 46th as a state is irrelevant. Being in the 40s is relevant. Indiana
needs to address that the product of our educational system is in the bottom quintile of our
country." John J. Shaughnessy, State's Poor SAT Ranking Is a Matter of Perspective: Depending
on Your Outlook, The Results Are Good, Bad or Irrelevant, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 12, 1999, at
Al. Indiana high school students also perform poorly on Indiana's proficiency test, the
Indiana Statewide Testing for Educational Progress Exam Plus (ISTEP+). John Krull &
Gregory Weaver, More Money Sought to Aid Teens Who Failed Test; Teachers Union Calls on
Legislature to Appropriate Funds to Help Correct Poor Showings on ISTEP Plus Exams,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 9, 1998, at B1. Beginning with the graduating class of 2000, every
third, sixth, eighth, and tenth grade student in Indiana must take the ISTEP+. Stacey
Fuemmeler, Problems Are Apparent, but Solutions Have Proven to Be More Elusive, EVANSVILLE
COURIER, May 10, 1998, at Al. After looking at the 1997 ISTEP+ results, experts said that
poverty plays a large factor in poor student performance on these standardized tests. Id.
Steve Gorman of the National Assessment of Education Program said that schools with
over ninety percent lower-income students score an average of 60 points lower (on a 500
point scale) than schools with middle-class students do on the ISTEP+. Id. Indiana
requires all public school sophomores to pass the ISTEP; the students must pass the ISTEP+
prior to graduation. Andrea Neal, A System Failing Students, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 12,
1998, at A16; Barb Albert, District Delaying ISTEP Test for Some Struggling High School
Students Aren't Taking Graduation Exam Because of Officials' Differing Policies, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Jan. 23, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Albert, Delaying ISTEP]. Indiana requires students
who fail the test to take remedial classes. John M. Flora, ISTEP Passing Rates Decline,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 27, 1999, at N1. The students then have five chances to pass the
ISTEP+ prior to graduation. Michele McNeil, Some Face ISTEP-Plus a 3rd Time,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 29, 1999, at S1. Although Indiana offers five chances to take the
test, some students are more prone to drop out of high school because they feel like they
are failures. Albert, Delaying ISTEP, supra at Al. Only fifty-four percent of Indiana
sophomores in 1997 passed the ISTEP+ exam. Krull & Weaver, supra at BI. The Indiana
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After hearing the alarming educational statistics, policymakers,
educators, and pundits of all types began to advocate various remedies
to this situation. Many, including President Clinton and President Bush,
advocate school choice.15  Currently, a number of states are
experimenting with nontraditional educational settings, some offering
parents an array of schools from which to choose.16 In addition to
traditional public schools and parochial schools, parents may choose to
Department of Education calculates that of the 67,000 Indiana students in the Class of 2000,
seventeen percent still need to pass the language arts portion of the ISTEP+ and twenty-
eight percent need to pass the math section. Barb Albert, Many Students Fail ISTEP Retest,
Educators Say They Won't Lower Standards, But Boosting Students' Morale Will Be Tough,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 19, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Albert, Many Students Fail]. J. David
Young, President of the Indiana State Teachers Association, responded to these test results
by stating that, collectively, we have failed the children of Indiana. Krull & Weaver, supra
at BI.
The City of Indianapolis exemplifies the problem-plagued Indiana educational system.
Low graduation rates and low standardized test scores highlight the struggles of the
Indianapolis Public School (IPS) system. Laura Winningham, Better Return on Education
Investment, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 15, 1998, at A19. In 1998, IPS students' SAT scores
were the lowest in Indiana. Ruth Holladay, Voucher Case Only Provides Supporters with More
Drive, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 2, 1999, at Cl. Approximately one-third of all IPS students
do not graduate from high school. Leonard N. Fleming, Report Rips IPS for Low Skills,
Graduation Rate, INDIANAPOLIS NEws, Oct. 21, 1997, at Al. In 1997, the Hudson Institute, an
Indianapolis Think Tank, and the Community Leaders Allied for Superior Schools
prepared a report analyzing the education in Indianapolis. Id. The study's results show
that schools were not demanding high expectations from their students. Id. Only a few
students were enrolled in honors classes. Id. The report compared the Scholastic
Assesssment Test scores of IPS students with other schools in Indiana. Id. IFS consistently
came in last place in each category and grade level. Id. The report predicts that for this
generation of students approximately 15,000 will not earn their high school diploma by age
eighteen. Id. One possible reason for these low graduation rates is the students'
performance on the ISTEP+. Barb Albert & Leonard Fleming, Majority of Sophs at IPS Fall
Short ISTEP Math, Language Arts Tests Trip up 79%, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Jan. 8,1998, at Al.
In 1997, only twenty-one percent of IPS sophomores passed the language arts and
mathematics portion of the ISTEP+. Neal, supra at A16. The results for the 1998 ISTEP+ are
worse than the 1997 results. See Thomas P. Wyman, Many Students Fail ISTEP Retest
Lawmakers Drops Effort to Eliminate 10th-grade Exam as Graduation Requirement, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Feb. 19, 1999, at Al. On the students' second attempt to take the required exam,
more Indianapolis public school students failed than passed. Albert, Many Students Fail,
supra at Al.
Is For an in depth discussion of school choice, see infra Section Bl.A. School choice
especially attracts parents whose income forces them to send their children to the local
public school. Nina H. Shokraii, School Choice 1998: A Progress Report, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, 14 (visited Jan. 15,1999)
<http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/education/fyi72.html>.
16 Id.
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send their children to magnet, alternative, or charter schools.17 Allowing
parents and students to choose their schools is one way that
policymakers, educators, and others are attempting to help American
students improve academically.18
School voucher programs, a type of school choice program, represent
one current attempt to address these concerns. 19 Typically, in school
voucher programs, state governments issue vouchers to parents of
school children, who may then choose a school, either public or private,
at which to redeem the voucher.20 This voucher pays a significant
portion of a student's educational expenses for one school year.21
Despite the alternative, school choice programs, in general, are
subjected to serious criticism because of concerns regarding potential
academic, social, and economic consequences. Some opponents of
school choice argue that these programs will result in racial
resegregation.22 Poor and minority students who do not have the means
to attend magnet or other nontraditional schools will have to remain at
inner-city public schools which may be underfunded, may employ less
qualified teachers, may have fewer academic resources, and may provide
limited opportunities for students.23 Other critics express concern that
school choice alternatives will take the "brightest" students away from
the public schools or that ultimately some public schools will have to
17 For a discussion on alternative schools, see infra Section I.A.1.a. For a discussion on
magnet schools, see infra Section l1.A.L.b. For a discussion on charter schools, see infra
Section II.A.3.
18 For a discussion on school vouchers as one way to provide parents a choice, see infra
Section II.B.
19 Scott A. Fenton, School Voucher Programs: An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 26 CAP. U. L.
REv. 645, 645 (1997). Opponents of school vouchers argue that, at best, voucher programs
will help a small group of students to gain a better education; at worst, the voucher
programs will only be educating a small, select group of students while discarding the rest
of the students in need of a better education. Al Ramirez, Vouchers and Voodoo Economics,
EDUc. LEADERSHIP, Oct. 1998, at 1.
20 Fenton, supra note 19, at 1.
21 CONTROVERSY, supra note 6, at 32. Numerous types of voucher systems exist. Andrew S.
Latham, School Vouchers: Much Debate, Little Research, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Oct. 1, 1998, at 82.
For example, a voucher may be offered to all students or only those students from lower-
income families. Id. The vouchers may be redeemed at any school (public or private,
sectarian or non-sectarian), or the voucher may only be redeemed at a public school within
a specific school district. Id.
22 Latham, supra note 21, at 82.
23 See Bennett et al., supra note 2. School choice may lead to increased separation of
students by cultural background, race, and social class. Sally Bomotti, Why Do Parents
Choose Alternative Schools?, EDUc. LEADERSHIP, Oct. 1, 19%, at 30,32.
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close.24 Others argue that school choice simply will not improve overall
student performance. 25
Voucher programs also raise a complex set of legal questions under
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under the religion
clauses of state constitutions. 26 This Note focuses on the legal aspect of
school voucher programs, and whether school voucher programs would
be constitutional under the federal Establishment Clause and under
Article I, sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution. While various
school choice alternatives and the issues they raise merit individual
consideration, this Note analyzes only the federal and state
constitutional questions that would arise if the Indiana legislature chose
to establish an educational voucher system in Indiana.
Section II provides historical background regarding education
reform, school choice alternatives, and voucher programs. 27 Section I
analyzes educational voucher programs under the U.S. Constitution. 28
Section IV analyzes the constitutionality of voucher programs under the
Indiana Constitution.29 Finally, Section V proposes a model voucher
program that could be implemented in Indiana. 3°
II. SCHOOL CHOICE AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS
Before analyzing the legal issues presented by voucher programs,
this Note begins by providing a background of the types of school choice
alternatives and the history of school vouchers. This Section first
discusses the types of school choice alternatives, including intradistrict
and interdistrict school choice and charter school programs as well as the
school choice alternatives available in Indiana. 31 This Section also traces
24 Peterson, supra note 6, at 16. The American Federation of Teachers has argued that, if
private schools are given the option to select the best students, the weaker schools will
incur greater hardship. Latham, supra note 21, at 82. This consequence would be a result of
the "brightest" students being pulled from the weaker schools. Id.
25 Barbara Miner, Why I Don't Vouch for Vouchers, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Oct. 1, 1998, at 5.
Some opponents to school choice claim that these programs only save a handful of
students, while the majority will have to remain in public schools. id.
26 Peterson, supra note 6, at 16. Some opponents of state-funded voucher programs argue
that public aid could end up in the coffers of the religious institutions that run the
parochial schools (Jewish, Catholic, Baptist, Christian Reformed, etc.). Id.
27 See infra notes 31-172 and accompanying text.
2B See infra notes 173-313 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 314-95 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 396-413 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 33-74 and accompanying text.
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the history of school vouchers, discussing modem proposals and
voucher programs that are currently in place.32
A. School Choice
"School choice" has various aspects and takes various forms.
Parents and students may choose between a public or private school,
based on factors such as where the family has decided to live and the
family's economic circumstances.3 In addition to the parents' choices,
students have choices pertaining to the courses of study offered at their
schools.34 States already offer a variety of school choices, each providing
a unique educational experience for students.35 The types of school
choice include intradistrict schools (alternative and magnet schools),
interdistrict schools, and charter schools.
1. Intradistrict school choice
Although school districts approach intradistrict school choice
differently, most Americans are familiar with the general concept of
intradistrict school choice which refers to choices already available to the
parents within the school district in which they reside.36 Some school
districts provide parents with the choice to send their children to any
32 See infra notes 75-172 and accompanying text.
33 In broad terms, school choice allows parents to pick the school that their children will
attend. Toch, supra note 7, at 48. Thus, the government is giving parents control to choose
where the public dollars designated for their child's education will be spent. Clint Bolick,
School Choice, the Law, and the Constitution: A Primer for Parents and Reformers, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, 12 (last modified Sept. 19,1997)
<http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/education/bg1139.html>. School choice
differs considerably from the traditional concept of assigning children to schools based on
where they live. Camilla Lehr, School Choice: A Handout for Parents, 11 (visited Feb. 12,
1999) <http://www.naspweb.org/services/cq/schchoice.html>. Although school choice
provides many options for the students and parents, school choice does not guarantee that
a student will attend the school he or she prefers. Id. Enrollment quotas and racial
desegregation laws may dictate whether a student is able to attend his or her first school of
choice. Id. See also Richard F. Elmore, Choice in Public Education, THE POLITICS OF
EXCELLENCE AND CHOICE IN EDUCATION, 79, 83-84 (William Lowe Boyd & Charles Taylor
Kerchner eds., 1988). C. Lee Cusenbary, Jr., Educational Choice Legislation After Edgewood v.
Kirby: A Proposal for Clearing the Sectarian Hurdle, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 269,275 (1991).
34 Elmore, supra note 33, at 83-84.
35 See generally P.W. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOULS OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1994). School choice alternatives are only limited by the
imaginations of those committed to improving America's educational system. Bolick, supra
note 33, at ! 2.
Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the Polemis of Legal
Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L REV. 1,10 (1993); see generally Lehr, supra note 33.
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school within the district, while other districts have stringent guidelines
requiring students to attend specific schools. 37 Some school districts
offer alternative schools and magnet schools as additional forms of
intradistrict school choicem
a. Alternative Schools
Alternative schools offer non-traditional learning opportunities to
students.39  These schools provide special instruction to minority
students or to students with special needs who, for instance, have severe
difficulty in mastering basic skills, are potential or actual dropouts, or
have disciplinary problems.40 However, because many students are sent
to alternative schools because of disciplinary problems, or because they
are classified as emotionally disturbed or chronic truants, many teachers
find these students detract from the educational process and avoid
teaching in the alternative school context, if possible.41 Parents are leary
of alternative schools for the same reasons.
b. Magnet Schools
Magnet -schools, presently flourishing throughout the country,
attract students with exceptional abilities in certain academic
disciplines.42 Magnet schools have three primary characteristics. First,
3 Daniel, supra note 36, at 10.
n Id. These schools are included within intradistrict choice because only students residing
within the school district may attend. Id.
39 See generally Alternative Schools-Some Answers and Questions, 14 URB. REV. 65 (1982)
[hereinafter Alternative Schools]. One example of an alternative school is the Home School
Connections Center in Bellevue, Washington. Bellevue School District, Home School
Connections Center, (visited Nov. 15,1999)
<http://belnet.bellevue.k2.wa.us/homeschool.html>. Operating under state law, the
school provides a supportive atmosphere for students. Id. The students' parents are the
primary teachers, attending classes and workshops with their children. Id.
40 Alternative Schools, supra note 39, at 65.
41 Leona Hiraoka, Face It, NEA TODAY, April 1996, at 4. Nationwide, seventy-three percent
of public school teachers think by removing troublemakers from class, academic
achievement would greatly improve. Id.
4 One example of a magnet school is the Martin Luther King, Jr. Magnet High School
located in Nashville, Tennessee. Martin Luther King, Jr. Magnet High School (visited Feb.
12, 1999) <http://mlk.dhs.org/ie.httnl>. This magnet school seeks to provide
academically gifted and talented students with a high quality education. Id. The MLK
Magnet school focuses on student career opportunities in the health sciences and
engineering fields. Id. Detroit's Renaissance High School, Michigan's twenty-one year old
public magnet high school, focuses on college admissions and has a reputation as a place
where educational excellence is a preoccupation. Debra Viadero, Higher Standards, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 18, 1999, at 52, 52-53. One magnet school, the Buckman
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the curriculum is specifically oriented to one particular academic
discipline, such as mathematics, science, fine arts, or foreign languages. 43
Second, a select group of qualified educators teach the students." Third,
magnet school administrators select the enrolled students from a variety
of school districts.45
Originally developed in an effort-to desegregate suburban schools,46
magnet schools sought to attract a racially diverse student population.47
In the 1960s, magnet schools placed limits on the number of minority
students who could attend so that white students would continue to
enroll.48 Currently, highly motivated students are still attracted to these
magnet schools because of the alternatives the schools provide to
traditional curricular offerings.49
2. Interdistrict School Choice
Some states provide parents with the opportunity of interdistrict
school choice.50 Interdistrict school choice allows parents to send their
children to other schools within the resident state if certain qualifications
are met.51 First, the student transfers cannot adversely affect state
desegregation mandates.5 2 Second, the receiving districts must agree to
accept transfer students.5 3 Third, the receiving districts must have ample
space within their schools to allow for transfers.5 4
Elementary School in Portland, Oregon, attracts students with exceptional talent in art.
Buckman Elementary School (visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://buckman.pps.k12.or.us/>.
43 Augustus F. Hawkins, Becoming Preeminent in Education: America's Greatest Challenge, 14
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367,380-81 (1991).
4 Id. at 380.
45 Id. at 381.
46 See Daniel, supra note 36, at 11.
47 Janet R. Price & Jane lK Stem, Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Integration and School
Reform, 5 YALE L & POL'Y REv. 291, 292 (1987).
48 See Daniel, supra note 36, at 12.
49 See Grant Gives Six Magnet Schools a Boost; $2.37 Million Grant Will Go Toward Improving
Curricula and Standards, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 18,1998, at B3 [hereinafter Grant].
50 Toch, supra note 7, at 48. Approximately twenty-four states are allowing 7.4 million
high school students to attend classes in other school systems without paying tuition. Id.
51 See Daniel, supra note 36, at 13. The concept of unlimited interdistrict choice is the same
as statewide open enrollment. Lehr, supra note 33, at 'l.
52 Daniel, supra note 36, at 13.
53 Id.
54 ld. at 13-14.
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3. Charter Schools
Since 1991, charter schools have been one of the fastest growing
developments in school reform programs.5 5 Designed and operated by
educators, community leaders, educational entrepreneurs, and parents,
charter schools are independent public schools that offer many
advantages over the traditional public schools, including improved
curriculum, innovative teaching methods, and greater community
involvement.56 Because charter schools are part of the public school
system, each state provides public funds to these schools.57 These funds,
while originally set aside for use at traditional public schools, are
diverted to the charter school when a child transfers to that school.5 8 The
state will release a charter school from the bureaucratic control that
governs traditional public schools as long as one condition is satisfied:
the charter school must improve student performance within a specified
period of time, usually five years.5 If student performance does not
improve during this time, the school loses its charter.60 Currently, thirty-
55 The first charter school began in Minnesota in 1991 under the "Outcome-Based School
Act." See MINN. STAT. § 120.064(1)(1003) (1991). A wide variety of charter schools exist
throughout the country; one example is the Discovery Elementary School in Fennville,
Michigan. U.S. Charter Schools, Discovery Elementary School (visited Feb. 12, 1999)
<http://www.uscharterschools.org/uscs-1/visit?x-a=v&x-id=3855>. The Discovery
program strives to help children gain competency in using modem technology, develop
good decision making skills, become critical thinkers, and develop respect for the world's
various cultures. Id. Another successful charter school that prepares students for a college
career, the Sport Sciences Academy in Hartford, Connecticut, concentrates on school-to-
career model educational techniques. U.S. Charter Schools, Sport Sciences Academy (visited
Feb. 12, 1999) <http://www.uscharterschools.org/uscs_/visit?x-a=v&x-id=870>. This
charter school's academic programming includes sports communication, sports
merchandising, and sports law. Id. The Choice 2000 On-Line Charter School operating out
of Perris, California, offers an innovative approach to education. U.S. Charter Schools,
Choice 2000 On-Line Charter School (visited Feb. 12, 1999)
<http://www.uscharterschools.org/uscs-l/visit?x-a=v&x-id=706>. Choice 2000's mission
is to provide all students with an opportunity to excel at vocational skills and to master life
all in preparation for the twenty-first century. Id. Students in New Jersey who display
outstanding abilities in artistic expression may choose to attend the chARTer TECH High
School for the Performing Arts in Ocean City, New Jersey. U.S. Charter Schools, chARTer
TECH High School for the Performing Arts (visited Feb. 12, 1999)
<http://www/uscharterschools.org/uscsj/visit?x-a=v&x-id=5235>.
56 Currents & Books, NEWDAY, Jan. 10,1999, at B7.
57 Id.
58 Id.
5 See Mortimer Zuckerman, Schools Our Kids Deserve, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 23,
1996, at 108. Local school boards have held a tight monopoly on how and where students
can receive government assisted schooling. Thomas Toch, The New Education Bazaar, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., April 27,1998, at 34,35 [hereinafter Bazaar].
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two states have charter schools, and over one thousand charter schools
are in operation nationwide.6 1
4. School Choice in Indiana
Indiana Governor Frank O'Bannon supports intradistrict public
school choice and public charter schools; however, the majority of
proposed school choice bills have not passed during O'Bannon's
administration. 62  Former Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith,
acknowledging that the Indiana residents who most strongly advocate
parental choice in education are minorities and the indigent, also
advocated parental choice. 63 Because middle- and upper-class families
have the ability to leave inner city areas, the families from the lower-class
are the strongest advocates for school choice.64 These families perceive
that the state educational system has trapped them and their children in
a "sub-par-education" system due to their socio-economic status.65
Currently Indianapolis is leading the state in its experiments with
various school choice alternatives, including magnet schools and private
educational scholarships. Magnet schools in Indianapolis provide
motivated students with unique educational experiences, including
60 See Currents & Books, supra note 56, at B7. Student improvement is seen in charter
schools that pursue educational excellence with the enthusiasm that many public schools
lack. Bazaar, supra note 59, at 35.
61 Currents & Books, supra note 56, at B7. Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are the
thirty-six states that currently have signed charter school laws. U.S. Charter Schools,
Overview of Charter Schools (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.ushcharterschools.org/gen nfo/gimain.htm>. For more information on
charter schools, see JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNrIY
FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION (1996).
62 School Choice Programs: Indiana (visited Nov. 15,1999)
<http://www.heritage.org/schools/indiana.html> [hereinafter Choice Programs].
63 Leonard N. Fleming, Mayor Backs Ideas on IPS After Listening to Public, Goldsmith Will
Focus on Support of School Choice, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 2, 1997, at Dl; Winningham,
supra note 14, at A19. See also Baker, supra note 14, at A13. Parent Power, an Indiana parent
education involvement and awareness project, conducted a survey of 600 parents of
Indiana school children. Id. When asked if parents wanted to choose their child's school,
seventy-nine percent desired this option. Id. Sixty-one percent of parents polled also
supported using public tax funds to assist in paying for private and parochial school
tuition. Id.
64 Winningham, supra note 14, at A19.
65 Editorial, A Big Day for School Choice, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 13,1998, at A8.
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programs in the performing arts, life sciences, environmental sciences,
communications, arts, and health education.66 Typically these programs
are not offered in other Indianapolis schools; therefore, students
throughout the Indianapolis Public Schools (IPS) system are eager to
participate in the magnet school alternative.67
In addition to offering unique educational experiences for gifted
students, Indianapolis also provides a limited number of lower-income
students with the opportunity to attend private schools. 68 J. Patrick
Rooney created the Educational CHOICE Charitable Trust program to
provide lower-income families with the same educational choices that
middle and higher-income families enjoy.69 The CHOICE program
provides private tuition scholarships to about one thousand Indianapolis
students in kindergarten through eighth grade.70 Funding for the
CHOICE scholarships comes from donations by area business leaders.71
Some members of the Indiana General Assembly also favor school
choice alternatives. In 1991 and again in 1992, Senate Bill 393 was
introduced into the Education Committee of the Indiana General
Assembly.'2 This legislation sought to provide "scholarships for all
children in the state to use at any school of their choice, reduce
regulation of scholarship-redeeming schools and give teachers and
schools more autonomy, provide for statewide testing, and add new
measures to help preschool children." 3 The bills, however, never made
it out of the Education Committee. 74
66 Grant, supra note 49, at B3.
67 Id.
69 Choice Programs, supra note 62. The Golden Rule Insurance Company began a private
scholarship program in 1991. Id. The Educational CHOICE Charitable Trust program
assists students from lower-income families by providing tuition scholarships for students.
Id.
69 Bill Theobald, 8 Donate Money for Scholarships Funds Help Poor Children to Afford Private
Education Through CHOICE Program, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 31, 1997, at Bi. J. Patrick
Ronney is the Chief Executive Office of the Golden Rule Insurance Co. Id.
70 Id. To be eligible for the CHOICE scholarship, students must be on the free or reduced-
price lunch program. Id. Eligible students receive half of their tuition costs, up to $800. Id.
71 Id. During the 1997-98 school year, the CHOICE program provided scholarships to
1,094 students, while 1,925 students remained on a waiting list. Choice Programs, supra
note 62. By 1998, the figures were up to 1, 703 scholarships and 4,168 on the waiting list.
Id.
72 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERAGENCY AFFAIRS,
CENTER FOR CHOICE IN EDUCATION, REvIEw OF STATE CHOICE LEGISLATION (Sept. 1992).
73 Id.
74 Id.
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B. School Vouchers
The initial calls for school choice75 came from economists and
philosophers and began in the United States in the late eighteenth
century.76 While these early calls dissipated,' the calls were renewed in
the middle twentieth century when Milton Friedman resurrected the
idea.77 Friedman's call for educational reform through the use of school
choice sparked exploration into different school choice options.7 One
option available for educational reform that reformers proposed is a
school voucher program. 9
1. Foundations of School Choice-A Vision for Vouchers
The modem notion of school choice builds upon the foundations laid
by Adam Smith, Thomas Paine, and John Stuart Mill, who advocated
competition and choice in the educational system.se In The Wealth of
Nations, Adam Smith81 suggested that schools could reach a higher
quality of education by allowing students to choose their own teachers
and schools.82 If afforded such a choice, students would flock to the
educational facilities with the most renowned, and interesting,
teachers8 3 Smith argued that student choice would encourage teachers
to be diligent and provide "tolerably good" lectures because students
would not attend otherwise.84 With diminished student participation,
ineffective teachers would be forced to improve their methods or risk
75 For a detailed summary of school choice in America, see THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, A SPECIAL REPORT: SCHOOL CHOICE (1992).
76 See Eric Nasstrom, School Vouchers in Minnesota: Confronting the Walls Separating Church
and State, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1065,1070 (1996).
77 For a discussion on the educational reform ideas of Milton Freedman, see infra Section
ll.B.2.
7 For a discussion of theorists', think tanks', and Presidents' programs to reform
education, see infra Section II.B.3.
79 Id.
80 Nasstrom, supra note 76, at 1070.
81 Born in 1723 in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, Adam Smith is known as the father of scientific
economics. D.D. RAPHAEL, ADAM SMITH 8 (1985); ADAM SMrrH AND MODERN POLITICAL
ECONOMY: BICENTENNIAL ESSAYS ON THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ix (Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr.
ed., 1979). For a general biography on the life and works of Adam Smith, see THE
ESSENTIAL ADAM SMITH (Robert L. Heilbroner & Laurence J. Malone eds., 1986).
82 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 819-46 (Edwin Canan ed., Modem Ubrary 1994) (1904).
Id. at 822-23.
84 Id. at 823. By establishing a dependent relationship between the teacher and student, the
teacher would have to be an effective and well-respected educator. Id.
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lecturing to an empty hall.85 Students dissatisfied with the mediocre
quality of education that they were receiving from one institution would
then choose to attend a different school.86 Smith thought that if a
school's enrollment began to diminish drastically, the school would be
forced to emulate the popular schools and offer high quality education.87
Therefore, to be financially stable, schools would compete to provide the
best educational programs and employ the finest teachers in order to
attract student attendance. 88
Thomas Paine8 9 advocated school choice for those students without
the means to attend the finest educational institutions.90 Paine asserted
that children of lower-class families should not be denied a quality
education if their parents were unable to afford one.91 Although public
schools were available at the time in some communities, Paine argued
that the public schools did not adequately serve the interests of the
poor.92 To provide all children with a quality education, Paine proposed
granting parents funds derived from taxes to allow parents to select their
children's schools.93 Moreover, Paine strongly advocated that parents
use these funds to create their own community-based private schools. 94
John Stuart Mil 95 built upon Paine's ideas arguing that parents
should be able to choose between public and private education for their
85 SMITH, supra note 82, at 823.
s6 Id.
87 Id.
89 Id. at 822-23. Smith also believed that a large portion of the teachers' income should
come from student tuition. RAPHAEL, supra note 81, at 79.
89 Born in 1737, Thomas Paine devoted his life to political faith. THE SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 102-03
(F.J.C. Hearnshaw ed., 1931). Paine's writings encouraged the American colonists to fight
for their independence. Id. at 103. For general biographies on the life and works of
Thomas Paine, see HARRY HAYDEN CLARK, THOMAS PAINE (1944), and FRANK SMrrTH,
THOMAS PAINE LIBERATOR (1938).
-O THOMAS PAINE, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE: RIGHTS OF MAN ESSAYS 59-60
(William M. Van der Weyde ed., 1925).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 60.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Born in 1806, John Stuart Mill spent his life searching for a systematic philosophy of
action and knowledge. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN STUART
MILL (1924). Mill called his philosophy "the inductive school." ALAN RYAN, JOHN STUART
MILL xi (1970). Although Mill created his own philosophy, he did not worry about the
consequences it might have on society. Id. For general biographies on the life and works of
John Stuart Mill, see WILLIAM THOMAS, MILL (1985); MICHAEL ST. JOHN PACKE, THE LIFE OF
JOHN STUART MILL (1954).
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children.9 6 Mill disagreed with Paine's assertion that only private
schools provide students with quality educational experiences.Y For
Mill, both public and private schools could effectively promote the
primary purpose of education, which is to train students to think for
themselves.98 These early philosophical discussions regarding school
choice and voucher programs from the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries laid the conceptual foundation for the modem
school choice movement.9 9
2. Milton Friedman-"The Father of School Vouchers"100
Milton Friedman has been one of the leading advocates for school
vouchers in the twentieth century. 101 Under Friedman's proposed plan,
the state government would give parents a voucher "redeemable for a
specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on 'approved'
educational services."02 The parents would then be free to redeem this
voucher at a public or private school103 Under Friedman's system,
parents who send their children to private schools would no longer pay
twice for education-first, indirectly through general property taxes and
second, directly through the private school fees.1°4 Parents desiring to
supplement the voucher would have the option to do so.105 In
Friedman's opinion, the voucher system would also foster competition
among schools by encouraging improvements and efficiency within the
educational market. 106 Essentially, Friedman's educational voucher
system seeks to improve family access to a high quality education.' 7
96 Daniel, supra note 36, at 4 (citing E.G. West, Tom Paine's Voucher Scheme for Public
Education, 33 S. ECON. J. 378, 379 (1967) (citing JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (Ashley ed., 1915) (London n.d.)).
w Id.
98 See THOMAS, supra note 95, at 46.
" See infra Section H.B.3.
100 See Naastrom, supra note 76 (calling Friedman the father of school choice).
101 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 89 (1962).
102 Id.
103 Id. Friedman continued to explain that the government would give parents choosing to
send their children to private schools a sum equal to the estimated cost of a public school
education. Id. at 93. The parents must redeem the voucher on their children's education in
an approved school. Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 FRIEDMAN, supra note 101, at 93. This notion of "free-market competition" among the
schools would increase the educational quality of each school. Latham, supra note 21, at 82.
107 Latham, supra note 21, at 82.
Smith: Educational Vouchers in Indiana? – Considering the Federal and St
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999
292 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
Friedman's proposals eventually drew the attention of academics,
educators, and conservative think tanks.108
3. Modem Development of School Choice-Advocating Vouchers
a. Modem Theorists
In the late twentieth century, two groups of theorists separately
studied the American educational system. John Coons and Stephen
Sugarman built on the ideas of Milton Friedman to create an educational
voucher system that would purportedly benefit all children. 1°9 John
Chubb and Terry Moe examined the reasons for the educational system's
failings and proposed a voucher program to improve the nation's
schools. 10 Both groups advocated the use of school voucher programs to
create better schools and to improve American academic achievement. 1 '
i. John Coons and Stephen Sugarman
John Coons and Stephen Sugarman based their program on Milton
Friedman's educational voucher system.112 They believed school choice
would best satisfy three widely embraced objectives that most
Americans want for schools: to serve the best interest of the individual
child; to foster consensus supporting the constitutional order; and to
achieve racial integration. 113  They proposed that the government
provide "scholarship certificates" 114 to students who could redeem the
certificates at state-approved schools of their choice.115 Under the Coons
'08 See infra Section II.B.3.
109 For a discussion of Coons and Sugarman's ideas, see infra Section II.B.3.a.i.
110 For a discussion of Chubb and Moe's ideas, see infra Section I.B.3.a.ii.
M11 See generally JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE
FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978); JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990).
112 COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 111, at 17.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 31. Both Coons and Sugarman and Chubb and Moe used the term "scholarship
certificates" instead of "educational voucher." Id. See also CHUBB & MOE, supra note 111.
Both terms encompass the same basic concept of the government giving money to parents
for redemption at a private or public school. Id. See also James B. Egle, The Constitutional
Implications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L REV. 459,465 n.41.
115 COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 111, at 32. The requirements for a school to gain state
approval were limited to concerns over fraud, safety, and minimal education
considerations. Id. The schools were also provided with the freedom to make their own
curriculum. Id. If the number of applicants for a particular school exceeded the school's
seating capacity, a lottery would be conducted to'determine which applicants would be
able to attend. Id.
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and Sugarman approach, parents would not have the option to increase
the value of the scholarship certificate.116 By including parochial schools
in this scholarship program, the educational system would include a
larger number of schools with diverse educational offerings.117 A larger
number would provide more choices and make it more likely that
students could attend their school of first choice.118 Thus, the demand
for exceptional educational institutions would create an incentive for
schools to improve the quality of education.119
ii. John Chubb and Terry Moe
The Brookings Institution, a conservative Washington think tank,
advocates school choice plans, endorsing the idea in Politics, Markets &
America's Schools.120 John Chubb and Terry Moe analyzed and compiled
data from numerous tests and surveys in an attempt to pinpoint the
factors that cause schools to fail. 121 The results showed that school
organization, student ability, and family background significantly affect
a student's academic achievement. 122 Chubb and Moe explained that,
even though these factors exist, the schools do not acknowledge them.123
Schools strive less to please students and parents, than to comply with
political agendas, democratic constituencies, and the administrators'
agendas. 124 According to Chubb and Moe, the public school systems are
116 Id. Parents would not be able to supplement the voucher because of the effect it would
create on the system. Id. One example of a voucher system that allowed parents to
increase the amount of the voucher is in Chile. Latham, supra note 21, at 82. Since 1980, the
country of Chile has been operating a voucher program. M. Carnoy, Is School Privatization
the Answer: Data from the Experiences of Other Countries Suggest Not, EDUC. WEEK, July 12,
1995, at 40, 52. Chile's voucher system has caused federal financial support of public
education to fall drastically. Id. The rich Chileans met this decline by adding to the
amount of the voucher in order to enroll their children in private schools. Latham, supra
note 21, at 82. However, the lower-income families did not have the means to add to the
vouchers and their children had to remain in the failing public schools. Id.
117 Egle, supra note 114, at 465.
11s COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 111, at 153-54.
119 Id.
12 See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note 111.
121 See id. at App. A.
122 CHUBB & MOE, supra note 111, at 140. In 1998, the Metropolitan Life Survey of the
American Teacher showed that out of all students who earn A's and B's, eighty-seven
percent of them cited their parents' involvement as important to their success. Brendan I.
Koerner, Parental Power, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 18, 1999, at 72. Half of the students
earning C's or worse reported that their parents were not involved or interested in the
student's education. Id. at 73.
123 See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note 111.
124 Id. at 38.
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now the "proving grounds" where governors experiment with or
attempt to implement their own values of public good and social
reform.12s
Further, Chubb and Moe proposed a school reform plan that would
be financed through tax-subsidized vouchers given to the parents as a
"scholarship." 126 Like Coons and Sugarman's system, Chubb and Moe's
plan also discourages parents from supplementing the scholarship
amount.127 Public, private, and parochial schools could all participate in
Chubb and Moe's system, a system that was based on a competitive
market model.128 These authors are convinced that school choice is
capable of bringing about reform by itself, even stating that, "without
being too literal about it, we think reformers would do well to entertain
the notion that choice is a panacea." 129
b. Presidential Administrations and American Education
Education reform has been a high priority on the agendas of the last
three presidential administrations. 13° Through numerous proposals,
Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have undertaken expansive reform
agendas to improve America's educational system.131
125 Id.
126 Id. at 215-26.
127 Id. at 220.
12 CHUBB & MOE, supra note 111, at 219. The private schools that participate would
become public schools under this system. Id. Parochial (religious) schools would be
admitted if the schools keep their religious customs clearly separated from their
educational duties. Id.
129 Id. at 217. Chubb and Moe continued their argument by stating:
Choice is a self-contained reform with its own rationale and
justification. It has the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of
transformations that, for years, reformers have been seeking to
engineer in myriad other ways. Indeed, if choice is to work to greatest
advantage, it must be adopted without these other reforms, since the
latter are predicated on democratic control and are implemented by
bureaucratic means .... [Choice] is a revolutionary reform that
introduces a new system of public education.
Id.
131) See generally LEON M. LESSINCER, ACcOUNTABILTY IN EDUCATION (1971); Michael Heise,
Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federalization and Legalization of Educational Policy, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1994); Daniel Johnson, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Parent
Involvement in the Improving America's School Act, 85 CAL L. REV. 1757 (1997).
131 See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5811-12 (1994); Federal Grants for
State and Local "GI Bills" for Children, H.R. 5664, 102d Cong. (1992); Federal Grants for
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i. The Reagan Administration
During President Ronald Reagan's two terms in office, the U.S.
House of Representatives and the Secretary of Education devised plans
to improve America's educational system.132 The House took the
initiative to create educational systems that would include some
elements of school choice.133 However, none of these bills passed.134
William Bennett, Secretary of Education in the Reagan
Administration, also considered solutions, such as parental school choice
and competition between private and public schools for federal money,
to address the problems facing the educational system.13 5 He explained
that a voucher system would provide such choice and competition
standards, by granting public money to parents who could choose the
schools, whether public or private, sectarian or non-sectarian, that their
children would attend. 13 6 Despite all of the reform efforts during the
Reagan years, no real improvements in the educational system were
made.137
ii. The Bush Administration
Drawing from the work of Chubb and Moe, President George Bush
created an educational reform plan called the "G.I. Bill for Children." 138
For President Bush, the future of America depended on reinventing the
current school system.139 His reform called for federal scholarships of
$1000 to be given to children from lower to middle-income earning
State and Local "GI Bills" for Children Act, S. 3010, 102d Cong. (1992); America Excellence
in Education Act 2000, H.R. 2460, 102d Cong. (1991).
32 President Reagan sought to meet the educational needs of children by declaring his last
month in office, January 1989, "America Loves Its Kids Month." Proclamation No. 5933, 54
Fed. Reg. 1915 (1989).
w Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Committee on
Finance on S. 550,97th Cong. 10 (1981).
Lu Id.
13 WILLIAM J. BENNETt, THE DE-VALUING OF AMERICA 65 (1992).
13 Id.
'3 Stanley M. Elam & Alec M. Gallup, 20th Annual Gallup Survey on Public's Attitudes
Toward the Public Schools, 70 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 33, 36 (1988). During President Reagan's
administration, only twenty-three percent of Americans gave public schools an A or B
rating. Id. The remaining poll results are C (48%), D (13%), F (3%). Id. American's
believed that the biggest problems facing the schools were drug use (32%), lack of
discipline (19%), lack of proper financial support (12%), difficulty getting good teachers
(11%), and poor schools/curriculum (11%). Id.
13 H.R. 5664, 102d Cong. (1992); S. 3010, 102d Cong. (1992).
1'" H.R. 5664, 102d Cong. (1992); S. 3010,102d Cong. (1992).
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families which would be redeemable at private and public schools. 14°
Congress, however, did not approve Bush's proposal.41
iii. The Clinton Administration
In 1994, under the Clinton Administration, the "Goals 2000: Educate
America Act" became law.142 The Act encouraged states 43 to improve
their educational systems before the new millennium. 144 Congress
established eight educational goals for America to reach by the year
2000: (1) school readiness; (2) school completion; (3) student
achievement; (4) teacher education and professional development; (5)
students would lead the world in mathematics and science achievement;
(6) adult literacy and lifelong learning; (7) safe, disciplined, and alcohol
and drug free schools; and (8) parental participation. 45 Objectives for
achieving these goals before the year 2000 accompanied each goal.146
c. Voucher Programs Presently in Place
Although President Bush's proposal for a federal voucher system
was not enacted, some states have adopted voucher programs. In
Wisconsin and Ohio, the legislatures have developed and implemented
140 Henry M. Levin, Market Approach to Education: Vouchers and School Choice, 11 ECON.
EDUC. REv. 279,281 (1992).
141 H.R. 5664,102d Cong. (1992); S. 3010,102d Cong. (1992).
142 Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5811-12 (1994).
143 141 CONG. REc. S1877-01 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995). Some states have already begun to
answer President Clinton's call by improving their educational systems. Columbus, Ohio,
is working to improve its science and mathematics instruction. Id. Ilinois has developed a
program for public school students to interact with scientists from Northwestern
University. Id. Minnesota parents are making statements to assist in improving their
children's education. Id.
144 141 CONG. REc. S1877-01 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995). Secretary of Education Dick Riley
spoke of the Goals 2000: Educate America Act in his State of Education Address. Id.
Secretary Riley explained that Goals 2000 would help local schools without restrictions
from the Department of Education. Id. Ninety-eight percent of the funding in the $400
million program is directly given to schools which complete an application form. Id.
Although the program has set goals, Secretary Riley reminded the audience that we need to
encourage ideas and remain flexible with these programs. Id. Riley advocated public
school choice and charter schools as ways to approach the various learning styles of
children. Id.
145 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-6084 (West Supp. 1997). See also Lisa Kelly, Yearning for Lake
Wobegon: The Quest for the Best Test at the Expense of the Best Education, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 41,51 (1998).
46 20 U.S.C.A. § 5812 (1994) For example, the objectives for the school completion goal are
to reduce the school dropout rate and to eliminate the gap between American minority and
non-minority students' graduation rates. Id. at § 5812(2)(b).
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scholarship programs for students from lower-income families. 147 In
Arizona, the legislature has created a similar scholarship program
funded by independent taxpayer contributions.148 All three of these
programs seek to provide students with better educational opportunities
through public funding granted to the students' parents.
i. Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was one of the first cities to implement a
voucher program. 149 In an attempt to improve its educational system,
the Wisconsin legislature enacted the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program (MPCP) in 1989, providing eligible students5 ° with the
opportunity to attend public or private, sectarian or non-sectarian
schools 51 outside of the problem-plagued Milwaukee Public School
system.152 Under the MPCP, the government pays for an eligible
147 See infra Sections lI.B.3.c.i., iii.
148 See infra Section II.B.3.c.ii.
149 Jo Ann Bodemer, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional Lemon-Aid from
the Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273,276 (1996).
150 The eligibility requirements are that a student (1) has to be in kindergarten through
twelfth grade; (2) has to be either enrolled in a Milwaukee public school, enrolled in a
private school under the MPCP or not enrolled in school during the previous year; and (3)
has to be a member of a family whose income did not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty
level. Wis. STAT § 119.23 (2)(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
151 The original MPCP only allowed non-sectarian schools to participate in the program.
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). The
1995 legislature amended that section to include all private schools. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.23(2)(b) (West 1996). The amended MPCP includes an "opt-out provision." Jackson,
578 N.W.2d at 609. This provision allows a -participating private school student to be
exempt from attending religious activities with a written request from the child's parent.
Id.
152 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612. In 1995, the Wisconsin legislature amended the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program (MPCP). Id. at 608. The MPCP required private schools to
comply with all safety and health codes applicable to Wisconsin public schools and the
anti-discrimination provisions imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Id. Section 2000d states
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1997).
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student's education with a voucher, 53 and the student's parents may
choose the school at which to redeem the voucher.15 4
After extensive litigation and debate regarding the issue of the
separation of church and state, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
Milwaukee's voucher system, making Wisconsin's voucher program the
first to permit the spending of public tax dollars on parochial
education.55 The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari,
perhaps indirectly encouraging other states to experiment with voucher
programs15 6
ii. Arizona
The Arizona legislature took a different approach to educational
reform.'57 Beginning in December 1997, the Arizona legislature allowed
up to a five hundred dollar state tax credit when a taxpayer voluntarily
contributed to a school tuition organization (STO).158 The statute does
153 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608. The State is limited to pay to the private schools the lesser of
two options: first, the educational programming operating cost per student, or second, the
equivalent to the Milwaukee Public School per student state aid. Id. The State of
Wisconsin decides which dollar amount the parents will be given. Id.
154 Id. The MPCP requires the State to pay the voucher to the parents directly. Id. To avoid
administration problems, the State sends the voucher to the private school and then the
parent endorses the check for the private school to use. Id.
155 Id. at 620. See also Section Il.B.1. for a discussion of the Jackson court's federal
Establishment Clause analysis. See Section IV.A.1. for a discussion of the Jackson court's
state constitutional analysis. See also Steve France, A New Test for Lemon, 84 A.B.A. J., Sept.
1998, at 30-31.
156 On Nov. 9, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review an appeal of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's decision in Benson. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). In an 8-1 ruling, only Justice Stephen Breyer voted to hear the
Wisconsin voucher dispute. Tony Mauro, Court Allows School Vouchers, USA TODAY, Nov.
10, 1998, at Al. Proponents of voucher programs declare that the Court's decision gives a
symbolic boost to voucher systems. Id. However, other voucher advocates are
disappointed with the Court's decision. Id. Chester Finn, Hudson Institution education
expert said, "I hoped we would get a definitive high court ruling that would apply to the
whole country." Id. Aside from public opinion, the Court's decision marks a significant
spot in political history. Martin McLaughlin, U.S. Supreme Court Permits State Subsidy to
Religious Schools (last modified Nov. 11, 1998)
<http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/novl998/vou-nll.shtml>. The Supreme Court has
permitted a state to subsidize sectarian education for the first time in America's history. Id.
157 See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
158 Id. at 609. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (West 1998). "School tuition
organizations" means an Arizona charitable organization that is exempt from federal
taxation (see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1999)). ld. The organization must also allocate, at a
minimum, ninety percent of its annual revenue for tuition grants or educational
scholarships to children to attend a qualified school, without limiting availability to only
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not allow taxpayers to designate their donation for their dependent's
direct benefit.159 The STO, however, would provide tuition grants or
educational scholarships to children attending their parents' choice of
qualified school.160 In January 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
the statute as valid under the federal Establishment Clause and
Arizona's religion clauses. 161
iii. Cleveland, Ohio
In 1996, the Ohio School Voucher Program (SVP) began offering
financial assistance to children from lower-income families so that they
could have the opportunity to attend sectarian or non-sectarian private
schools. 162 The program provides scholarships for students to attend
alternative schools and tutorial assistance grants for an equal number of
students attending public schools. 163  Under the SVP, the state
superintendent establishes an application process for students in
kindergarten through third grade164 who desire to participate in the
scholarship program.165 While preference is given to students from
lower-income families, 16 the superintendent has the discretion to award
one school. Id. If a husband and wife file a joint tax return, the five hundred dollar tax
limit still applies. Id. However, if a husband and wife file separate tax returns, each may
only claim one-half of the tax credit, two hundred and fifty dollars. Id.
159 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (West 1998).
160 Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 609 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (West 1998)). A
"qualified school" is a nongovernmental primary or secondary school that satisfies
Arizona's requirements for private school status and does not discriminate on the basis of
sex, race, color, creed, family status, or national origin. Id. at 610.
161 Id. at 625. See also Section Ill.B.2. for a discussion of the Kotterman court's federal
Establishment Clause analysis. See Section W.A.2. for a discussion of the Kotterman court's
state constitutional analysis.
16- OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975 (West 1999). Ohio's Republican Governor, George
Voinovich, signed the $5 million voucher program in 1995. School Choice Programs, 1999-
Ohio (last modified Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.heritage.org/schools/ohio.html>.
Beginning in 1996, the program allowed approximately 1,855 elementary students to use
vouchers. Id. Governor George Voinovich made Ohio the first state to enact a school
choice program that included religious schools. Id. See generally, Andrew A. Adams, Note,
Cleveland, School Choice, and "Laws Respecting an Establishment of Religion," 2 TEX. REV. L. &
POLmcs 165 (1997).
163 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A)(West 1999).
164 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(C) (West 1999). The superintendent will initially only
grant scholarships to students enrolled in kindergarten through third grades. Id. Once a
student has received a scholarship, the student may continue to receive the scholarships
until the completion of eighth grade. Id.
165 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(B) (West 1999).
1- OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(C) (West 1999).
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as many scholarships as necessary. 167 If a student chooses to attend a
public school, the superintendent distributes the funds directly to the
school.16 If a student chooses a private school, however, the
superintendent issues the voucher to the parents.169 This system was
challenged. After an Ohio trial court upheld it,17 the Ohio Court of
Appeals found the program's inclusion of private, sectarian schools to be
unconstitutional under both the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution.1" Recently, however, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the SVP did not violate the state or federal constitutions.12
Ill. FEDERAL CONSTITInONAL REQUIREMENTS
State voucher programs may be subjected to challenge under the
U.S. Constitution because qualified students may choose to use their
167 Id. Each year, the Ohio General Assembly appropriates a sufficient amount of money to
fund the Pilot Program. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(C)(1) (West 1999). The
superintendent awards the number of scholarships based on the General Assembly's
allocation. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(B) (West 1999). However, the superintendent
may not award more than fifty percent of the scholarships to nonpublic school students. Id.
168 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.979 (West 1999).
169 Id. Then the parents will redeem the voucher at the private school of their choice.
Adams, supra note 162, at 169. If the Pilot Program is discontinued, all students who are
currently attending alternative schools will be granted continued admittance. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3313.975(C)(2) (West 1999). The students will be subject to the same
attendance guidelines as when they were participating in the Pilot Program. Id. Also, if
the General Assembly fails to appropriate funds for the program, the tuition charged to
parents of alternative school students will not be increased beyond the amount equal to the
original scholarship. Id.
170 See Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721, 1996 WL 466499 (Ohio. Coin. Pl.
July 31,1996). Judge Sadler found the Program to be constitutional. Id.
171 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 1, 1997). The court held that the program's substantial and direct, non-neutral
government assistance to religious schools has the "primary effect of advancing religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause." Id. at *9.
1I2 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211 (Ohio 1999). On August 24, 1999, one day
before school started, U.S. District Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr. ordered the voucher program
to stop while he determined its constitutionality, despite the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling.
Judge Blocks School Vouchers, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1999, at A6. On August 27, 1999, the U.S.
District Court from the Northern District of Ohio granted a limited stay in the proceedings
with a few modifications, including that the stay is only applicable to students who were
enrolled in the Pilot Program under the 1995 Act, the stay is not applicable to new
enrollees, and the stay is only extended for one semester or until the court renders a final
decision. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, Nos. 1:99 CV 1740, 1:99 CV 1818, 1999 WL 669222
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 1999). The United States Supreme Court stayed the preliminary
injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio pending the
final disposition of the appeal by the 6th Circuit. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 1999 WL
1007170 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1999).
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vouchers to attend religious schools. The question arises whether a
sectarian school's indirect receipt of state funding "establishes" religion
in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.17 3
Applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 174 the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that "Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."175 The framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to
protect religious freedom and to insure religious autonomy by
prohibiting the establishment or imposition of a national church and by
prohibiting favoritism of any particular denomination.1 76 In interpreting
this guarantee to bar laws that favor religion, the Supreme Court has
declared that this amendment was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and state."177 While the U.S. Supreme Court has not
specifically determined whether school voucher programs are
constitutional under the U.S. Constitution,178 its case law is instructive
regarding the tests that would likely apply.1 79 State supreme courts have
specifically considered whether voucher programs that include private
173 Daniel, supra note 36, at 57. For cases involving parochial schools, the Supreme Court
has a long established requirement of a strict separation between government and religious
institutions. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 665-81 (1998). Most opponents of school
voucher programs argue that once any amount of public funds enters a religious school,
this violates the First Amendment. Bolick, supra note 33, at 3. However, if these arguments
were justified, federal daycare vouchers and Pell Grants would not be in existence. Id.
174 U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The Supreme Court determined that the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable to the states in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). For a discussion of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see William J. Brennan, Jr., Color-Blind, Creed-Blind, Status-Blind, Sex-Blind: It's
All There, In the Fourteenth Amendment. But Why Are These Principles Under Relentless Attack
Today?, HUM. RTS., Winter 1987, at 30.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The simplistic language of the Establishment Clause has created
complex and evolving interpretation by the Supreme Court. See generally, Kristin M.
Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring of Lemon and the Search
for a New Test, 27 PAC L.J. 121 (1995). "The dearest command of the Establishment Clause
is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228,244 (1982).
176 Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The Framers intended the Establishment
Clause to guard against three evils: financial support, sponsorship, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity. Id.
17 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,15-16 (1947).
17 The U.S. Supreme Court has denied petitions for writ of certiorari in two cases seeking
to determine the constitutionality of voucher programs. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d
606 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 283 (1999), and Rhodes v. Killian, 120 S. Ct. 42 (1999);
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
179 See infra Section I.A.
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sectarian schools are constitutional under federal Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.18s
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
During the last half of the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court
has articulated several different approaches to analyzing Establishment
Clause cases.181 The Court began with a strict separationist approach,182
molding this principle of separation into the Lemon test in 1971.1s3 The
Court used the Lemon test in analyzing school aid cases until 1985.184
More recently, however, the Court has adopted a less-stringent, multi-
factor approach.lrs
180 See infra Section m.B.
181 John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional
Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 421 (1996).
182 Id. at 422. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion." Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,15 (1947). Also, absolutely no tax could be levied to assist any religious
institutions or activities. id. at 16. The Court in Everson also declared that all state and
federal laws would be struck down as unconstitutional if they did not conform to the
separationist principles. Witte, supra note 181, at 422.
183 For a discussion of the Lemon test, see infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
184 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
Using the three-pronged Establishment Clause test, the Court invalidated tax schemes
allowing reimbursement payments for parochial school tuition. Id. See also infra notes 204-
217 and accompanying text. The Court prohibited public employees from teaching in
religious schools. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). See infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text. The Court also
prohibited the State from loaning textbooks to religious schools. Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975).
18 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
These cases demonstrate the Court's growing appreciation for religious equality, pluralism,
and voluntarism. Witte, supra note 181, at 426 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607
(1988)). The Court's new approach towards Establishment Clause jurisprudence
incorporates a multi-factor test within the second prong of Lemon. Id. at 425. The
"neutrality" test looks to three factors to determine if the challenged program has the
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. CONTROVERSY, supra note 6, at 56.
The three factors are (1) facially neutral by demonstrating no preference for religion; (2)
broad class of beneficiaries; (3) indirect aid/private choice. For a discussion about the
"neutrality" approach towards Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Douglas Laycock,
Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 933
(1990).
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1. Early Cases: Finding a Test
The 1947 Supreme Court decision in Everson v. Board of Education'86
established the modem foundation for the Court's current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. The Everson Court considered a New Jersey
statute allowing the state to reimburse parents for the bus fares they paid
to transport their children to public and private schools.187 Speaking for
the Court, Justice Black stated that "the First Amendment has erected a
wall between church and state that must be kept high and
impregnable."18 8 Even though the Court upheld the state reimbursement
program when money was paid to parents whose children attended
religious schools, the Court set a standard that would limit
governmental assistance in the future. 18 9 The Court announced that "no
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 190
Although the Everson Court was united in deciding that the state
could not directly aid religion, the Court was divided on whether
indirect aid to religious institutions violated the Establishment Clause.191
The Court found significant the fact that the reimbursement payments
went directly to the parents, not to the schools. 192 The Court concluded
that the state, by giving aid to the parents, would not be supporting the
sectarian schools through monetary contributions.193 The program
would merely help parents get their children to and from accredited
schools safely and expeditiously, regardless of the children's religion.194
Building on the Everson decision and subsequent case law, in 1971
the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman1 95 held that programs in Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania that reimbursed sectarian schools for the
salaries paid to secular educators teaching secular subjects within those
sectarian schools were unconstitutional.19 The Supreme Court in Lemon
M 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
187 Id. at 16.
188 Id. at 18.
189 Id. at 16.
190 Id. at 16.
191 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 59-60 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
192 Id. at 18.
193 Id.
19 Id.
M 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
19 Id. at 612-13.
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developed a three-pronged test (the "Lemon test") to evaluate the
constitutionality of government action under the Establishment
Clause.19' In Lemon, the Court required that government programs
providing assistance to sectarian schools satisfy all three prongs of the
test to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.198 First, the law must
have a secular legislative purpose.199 Second, the law must not have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.2° Finally, the law
must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.201
Although the Lemon test has been severely criticized and applied
differently, 22 the Court has never overruled the three-pronged Lemon
analysis. Thus, for nearly thirty years, the Lemon test has provided the
primary analytical model in Supreme Court Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.20
2. Transitional Cases: Debating Tests
In 1973, the Court used the three-pronged test to reach its holding in
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.2°4 In
Nyquist, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a New
York program that granted direct tuition reimbursement payments to
197 Id.
198 Id.
19 Id. at 612-13 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
2m Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)).
21 Id. at 613. "Incidental religious 'effect' or modest 'entanglement' of church and state
was tolerable, but defiance of any of these criteria was constitutionally fatal." Witte, supra
note 181, at 423.
2M In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, Justice Scalia, concurring in
the Court's opinion, compared the three-pronged Lemon test to a resurrected ghost stating:
[L]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again, frightening the little children and school attorney .... The
secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It
is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but
we can command it to return to the tomb at will.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392 (1993). But see
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), in which the Court made the third prong part of the
effects inquiry for state aid cases. See also Kenneth W. Starr, The Establishment Clause, 41
OKLA. L. REv. 477, 483 (1988) (discussing how the rigid Lemon test fails to consider the
values the Establishment Clause intended to impose).
2m Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRoBs. 423,433 (1995).
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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parents of children attending private, sectarian schools.2 5 In considering
the first prong of Lemon, whether the program has a secular legislative
purpose, New York argued that this program prevents financial crisis in
public education that would occur if the number of private schools
declined.206  By granting tuition reimbursements to lower-income
families sending children to private schools, New York argued, non-
public schools would continue to exist and flourish.2°7 The state also
argued that the program provided lower-income families with
additional educational choices.208 The Nyquist Court agreed with New
York, holding that the program had a secular legislative purpose of
promoting diversity and pluralism in public and private schools.209
Although the program survived the first prong of the Lemon test, the
program failed under the second prong.210 Under the second prong of
Lemon, the Court in Nyquist concluded that the program had the primary
effect of advancing religion because, in the New York program, only
parents of private sectarian school students received tuition
reimbursement payments. 211 Thus, by creating incentives to attend
sectarian schools, the program was not neutral toward religion.212 The
non-neutrality aspect of the New York program created the appearance
that the state was advancing religion through this program, and thus the
Court found that the program violated the Establishment Clause.213 By
not adequately ensuring that these public funds would be used only for
neutral, nonideological, and secular purposes, the Court found this form
of aid to be unconstitutional. 214
2 Id. at 759. The Governor of New York designed this "Elementary and Secondary
Education Opportunity Program" to assist parents in low-income brackets whose children
attended private schools. Id. at 764. In the program, the government gave a parent who
earned less than $5,000 in taxable income a direct, unrestricted grant of $50 to $100 per
child. Id. at 780. The governor limited this grant to no more than 50% of the actual tuition
paid to attend the private school. Id.
M Id. at 765.
m7 Id. The State would provide the means for students from lower-income families to
attend private schools. Id. Before this program existed, most lower-income families were
only able to send their children to free public schools. Id. By offering the opportunity for
larger enrollment in the private schools, the private schools could continue to operate. Id.
2 Id.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773.
210 Id. at 780.
211 Id. at 764,794.
212 Id. at 782.
213 Id.
214 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780.
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After holding that the New York program failed the "effects" prong
of the Lemon test, the Court determined that it did not need to analyze
the program under the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon.21s The
Court, however, observed that the type of assistance necessary to ensure
that the program would operate effectively presented a "grave potential
for entanglement." 216 Although Nyquist seemed to indicate that direct
state assistance to sectarian schools was impermissible, Justice Powell's
majority opinion stated that incidental and indirect aid to religious
institutions could be sustained.217
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Mueller v. Allen218 reached the opposite
result when reviewing a similar legislative program. In Mueller, the
Supreme Court held that a statute granting a deduction to Minnesota
taxpayers for educational expenses did not violate the Establishment
Clause.219 After acknowledging that the statute clearly had the secular
legislative purpose of reducing the educational costs incurred by
parents, considering the primary effect of the statute, the Court
concluded that it did not further sectarian purposes of private schools,
basing its holding on certain features of the Minnesota program.220 First,
215 Id. at 794.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 775. The following statement by Justice Powell provides a foundation for a valid
school voucher program:
These cases simply recognize that sectarian schools perform secular,
educational functions as well as religious functions, and that some
forms of aid may be channeled to the secular without providing direct
aid to the sectarian. But the channel is a narrow one .... Of course, it
is true in each case that the provision of such neutral, nonideological
aid, assisting only the secular functions of sectarian schools, served
indirectly and incidentally to promote the religious function by
rendering it more likely that children would attend sectarian schools
and by freeing the budgets of those schools for use in other nonsecular
areas. But an indirect and incidental effect beneficial to religious
institutions has never been thought a sufficient defect to warrant the
invalidation of a state law.
Id.
218 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
219 Id. at 402-03. Minnesota's statute provided for a deduction from a state taxpayer's gross
income for certain educational expenses. Id. at 391. The expenses included transportation,
textbooks, and tuition, as well as special equipment required for classes (e.g. ice skates,
tennis shoes, art supplies, and notebooks). Id. at 391-92, n.2. The deductions were capped
at $500 per student in kindergarten through sixth grade and $700 per student in seventh
grade through twelfth. Id. at 391.
= Id. at 396. In discussing the first prong of Lemon, the Court reasoned that it was
reluctant to find the State's motives unconstitutional. Id. at 394. Looking to the prior
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Minnesota's statute was facially neutral and made no preference toward
religion.221 In addition to providing educational deductions for parents
of public or private school children, medical expenses and charitable
contribution deductions were also included. 222 The Court reasoned that
it has traditionally allowed state legislatures broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes because legislatures are
uniquely situated to "achieve an equitable distribution of the tax
burden."m Second, Minnesota's statute had a broad class of
beneficiaries.22 4 In sharp contrast to Nyquist, the Minnesota statutory
benefit was available to parents whose children attended public schools,
non-sectarian private schools, or sectarian private schools. - The Court
determined that a program that rewards a broad class of beneficiaries
does not create the primary effect of advancing religion.226 Third, the
Court found that Minnesota gave public aid only indirectly to religious
institutions.227 Specifically, Minnesota's system disbursed public funds
to parents who could choose where to send their children to school. 228
The Court reasoned that because it is the parents who direct the funds to
a private, sectarian school, it is only the parent's private choice that
indirectly advances religion.229 Considering these three factors of
neutrality, the Court determined that the effect of Minnesota's statute
was neither to advance nor inhibit religion.230
Establishment Clause decisions, the Court stated that it could usually find a secular
purpose within a statute. Id.
221 Id. The Minnesota statute offered state benefits to all parents with school age children.
Id. The statute offered benefits to public and private, sectarian and non-sectarian students.
Id.
22 Id. at 396.
2" Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
224 Id. at 397.
22 Id. The statute struck down in Nyquist only provided benefits to the parents of
nonpublic sectarian schoolchildren. Id. at 398.
n6 Id. at 398.
22 Id. at 399.
2n Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
22 Id. Under this indirect aid system, the parents are furthering religion. Id. The State is
not furthering religion because it is not directly giving public funds to private sectarian
schools. Id.
= Id. at 402. The Court also held that the Minnesota statute did not excessively entangle
the state in religion. Id. at 403. The Court discussed the possibility of entanglement in
regards to one scenario, when state officials determine whether specific textbooks qualify
for a deduction. Id. According to the statute, deductions are not allowed for materials
used to teach religious doctrines, worship or tenets. Id. Therefore, the Minnesota statute
passed all three prongs of the Lemon test successfully. Id.
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In 1985, when it decided Aguilar v. Felton, 31 the Supreme Court
reverted back to a strict application of the Lemon test. Under Title I of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title I"),2 32 the U.S. government channels
federal funds to local educational agencies, which use the funds to
provide eligible school children 33 with greater educational
opportunities.2m The Board of Education of the City of New York
("Board") sought to use federal funds, to provide these services to school
children in private, sectarian schools. 23s In an attempt to avoid potential
constitutional violations regarding the separation of church and state,
New York restricted Title I instructional programs at private, sectarian
schools, reminding the teachers that Title I shall only advance secular
purposes.2-
Despite the Board's efforts to avoid Establishment Clause issues, the
Aguilar Court invalidated New York's use of Title I funds,237 holding that
New York's use of Title I federal funds to compensate secular teachers
who taught parochial school children violated the Establishment
' 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
2 20 U.S.C. § 6301-03 (1999). Originally enacted by Congress as Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the United States provided financial aid to local
educational agencies that focus on improving educational opportunities for children from
lower-income families. 20 U.S.C. § 2701 (1982). As of October 1982, Title I was superseded
by the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981. 20 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982).
More recently, Title I has been reenacted in the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301-03).
2M The eligibility requirements for proposed programs to receive Title I funds are (1) the
student must live within the attendance boundaries of a public school located in a lower-
income area; (2) the student must either be failing, or at risk of failing, the State's
performance standards; and (3) the proposed program must supplement programs that
would not exist but for the Title I funding. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 405-06.
234 Id. at 406. The New York Title I program used regular employees of the public schools
to provide special services for eligible children in both public and parochial schools. Id.
The teachers were assigned to parochial schools on a voluntary basis, often spending less
than five consecutive weekdays at the same school. Id.
m Id. Beginning in 1966, the Board provided Title I instructional services to parochial
school students on parochial school campuses. Id. From 1981-82, only 13.2% of all eligible
Title I recipients were attending parochial schools. Id.
236 Id. at 407. New York City instituted a number of safeguards to prevent teachers from
using their publicly funded positions to inculcate religion. Id. Teachers were monitored by
a field supervisor and others who would occasionally make unannounced visits. Id. The
professionals involved in the program were instructed to avoid involvement in religious
activities and to bar religious subjects in the classroom. Id. The Government provided all
the materials used in the program, and these materials could only be used in the Title I
program. Id. Title I personnel were solely responsible for selecting participants, and were
to keep contact with private school personnel to a minimum. Id. Finally, the classrooms
used for Title I classes had to be cleared of all religious symbols. Id.
237 Id. at 414.
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Clause.2n The Court ruled that the Board's program failed the third
prong of the Lemon test regarding excessive entanglement between
church and state239 because the state would need to extensively monitor
"pervasively sectarian" schools to ensure that the aid was used
appropriately, thus infringing upon fundamental Establishment Clause
values.240
Since its decision in Aguilar, the Court has returned to a "neutrality"
based analysis as established in Mueller when deciding school-aid cases.
In 1986, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,241 the
Court considered a school-aid program, holding unanimously that the
=3 Aguilar, 743 U.S. at 414. The same day the Supreme Court decided Aguilar, the Court
also decided a similar school-aid case, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball. 473 U.S. 373
(1985). In line with the Court's holding in Aguilar, the Court in Ball held that the Shared
Time and Community Education programs offered in the Grand Rapids, Michigan,
nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 397. The Shared Time program
employed public school teachers to offer supplementary classes at nonpublic schools. Id. at
375-76. The teachers taught the classes during the school day in nonpublic schools and the
subjects ranged from remedial mathematics and reading to enrichment music and physical
education. Id. at 375. The Community Education program that was taught by part-time
public school teachers was opened to children and adults. Id. at 377. The Community
Education program offered a wide-range of programs including Spanish, chess, model
building, and drama. Id. at 376-77. Both programs were taught in nonpublic classrooms in
which all religious paraphernalia was removed. Id. at 378. The Ball Court held that both
programs have the primary effect of advancing religion, therefore violating the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 396. The Court reasoned that both programs may provide the
symbolic unification of church and state, especially in the minds of schoolchildren. Id. at
389-92. Second, the teachers may intentionally inject their religious beliefs into the
programs. Id. at 385-89. Finally, by teaching a majority of the secular subjects in nonpublic
schools, the program's teachers are subsidizing the schools' religious functions. Id. at 393-
97.
2 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14. The Aguilar Court did not focus on the first two prongs of
the Lemon test, but instead, focused its attention on the problem of entanglement,
proscribed by the Lemon Court. Id. at 412. The entanglement elements are: (1) the
government must not provide aid in a pervasively sectarian atmosphere; and (2) the
government is required to constantly inspect the program to ensure that teachers are not
injecting religious messages. Id. The Aguilar Court held that both entanglement elements
were present in the Title I program. Id. at 412-13.
240 Id. at 414. The Court explained its interpretation of "pervasively sectarian" by
comparing the program in Aguilar to the program in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board,
426 U.S. 736 (1976). Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 411. In Roemer, the Court held that state aid to
religiously affiliated educational institutions did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758-59. The Roemer Court reasoned that the school was not pervasively
sectarian because the State was able to identify separate secular functions within the school.
Id. at 765. This is distinct from Aguilar, where the school that received Title I funds
reported back to their respective religious association and the schools required attendance
at religious activities. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412.
21 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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State of Washington could provide a vocational tuition grant to a blind
student studying to become a pastor at a Christian college.242 In
analyzing whether the program was neutral, the Court focused on two
core factors that demonstrated that the Washington vocational tuition
assistance program was neutral to religion.23  First, under the
Washington program, the aid was paid directly to the student who
would then transfer the money to the educational institutions of the
student's choice.244 Second, the program's benefits were available to
students without regard to the nature of the educational institution, and
the program in no way preferred religious institutions.245
Another school-aid case that is similar to Witters is Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District.246 In Zobrest, the Court held that a California
school district's action of providing an interpreter, pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), for a sectarian high
school student did not violate the Establishment Clause.247 The Court
reasoned that the beneficiaries were the disabled children, not the
schools. 248 Second, the aid flowed indirectly to the schools after the
parents and students choose the educational facility.249  Finally, the
program offered benefits to students who attended public or private
schools.250 Therefore, the IDEA has created a neutral program that does
not advance religion nor violate the Establishment Clause.25 1
3. The Most Recent Establishment Clause Case: Settling on a Test
The Court's multi-factor neutrality approach articulated in Mueller,
its unanimous decision in Witters, and its decision in Zobrest established
the legal standards that would govern its consideration of school-aid
cases.252  In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Agostini v. Felton,2 -
242 Id. at 482.
243 Id. at 488.
244 Id.
245 Id. The assistance program does not provide greater benefits for students enrolled in
sectarian institutions. Id. The choice to attend a sectarian or non-sectarian institution is
made by the student, not the government. id.
2- 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
247 Id. at 3.
248 Id. at 12.
249 Id.
2w Id. at 10.
251 Zobrest, 509 US. at 13-14.
252 See Doug Roberson, The Supreme Court's Shifting Tolerance for Public Aid to Parochial
Schools and the Implications for Educational Choice: Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997),
21 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 861 (1998).
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reversing its prior holding in Aguilar, after finding that the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence had changed significantly. 2 4 In
overruling Aguilar, the Court reconsidered what it had said in Meek v.
Pittenger,2 School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,2s6 and Aguilar regarding
the allegedly symbolic union between states and religious schools.257
In Agostini, the Court reconsidered the validity of New York's Title I
program which it had declared unconstitutional in Aguilar.258 The
Agostini Court concluded that the Court in Meek and Ball, in determining
- 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The Agostini case was a five-four decision written by Justice
O'Connor. Id. In 1995, the Board and a group of parents, hereinafter "petitioners," sought
to have the Supreme Court relieve the party from the Aguilar holding. Id. The petitioners
filed a Rule 60(b)(5) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Rule 60(b)(5)
states that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment when the judgment would
no longer have the same application. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). The Agostini Court
reexamined its rulings in Aguilar, Ball, and Meek to determine if petitioners' were entitled to
a Rule 60(b)(5) motion. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 217-18.
24 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222.
255 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In 1975, the Supreme Court in Meek held that a Pennsylvania Act
that provided nonpublic sectarian schoolchildren with instructional materials and teachers
violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 372. However, providing textbooks to sectarian
students was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 361. The Pennsylvania
General Assembly created Acts 194 and 195 in 1971. Id. at 352. Act 194 allowed public
employees to provide nonpublic sectarian school children with auxiliary services similar to
those readily available to public schoolchildren. Id. at 353. These services included speech
therapy, psychological therapy, instruction for exceptional and remedial students and
other secular, nonideological services. Id. Act 195 instructed the State Secretary of
Education to lend textbooks without a charge to nonpublic schoolchildren as well as
providing useful instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic schools. Id. at 353-54.
The Meek Court held that Act 194 violated the Establishment Clause because of the
potential for political entanglement. Id. at 372. The Court reasoned that the Pennsylvania
government would have to make continual efforts to guarantee that the public employees
were not advancing the religious missions of the nonpublic sectarian schools while
providing Act 194 services. Id. at 370. This surveillance to maintain the public employee's
neutrality would cause great administrative entanglement. Id. at 372. Therefore, the Court
reversed the District Court, reasoning that Act 194 created an establishment of religion and
caused excessive entanglement. Id. at 373. The Court analyzed the textbook and
instructional materials provisions of Act 195 separately. Id. at 361. The Court held that Act
195's program of lending textbooks to nonpublic schoolchildren was constitutional. Id.
The Court reasoned that granting this financial benefit to children and parents, instead of
directly to the religious schools, did not cause any Establishment Clause violations. Id.
However, the Court struck down Act 195's provision allowing the lending of instructional
materials and equipment to nonpublic schools. Id. at 363. The Court reasoned that this
action was neither indirect nor incidental and would inescapably result in advancing
religion. Id. at 365-66.
256 473 U.S. 373 (1985). For a discussion of the Ball case, see supra note 238.
Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). See also Roberson, supra note 252, at 861.
25 Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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that the programs had the "impermissible effect of advancing religion,"
had based its decisions on three questionable assumptions: (1) public
employees who work on religious school grounds inculcate religion in
their work; (2) the presence of public employees on religious school
premises creates a symbolic union between church and state; and (3) all
-public money that aids the educational function of religious schools
impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even when the money
reaches religious schools as a consequence of private decision-making.259
The Court determined that the Aguilar decision rested on a fourth
assumption: the program necessitated an excessive government
entanglement with religion because extensive monitoring would be
required to ensure that teachers paid with public funds would not
inculcate religion.260
The Agostini Court concluded that its more recent jurisprudence,
particularly its decisions in Zobrest and Witters, had undermined the four
assumptions in Meek, Ball, and Aguilar.261 The Agostini Court recognized
that the first two assumptions of Meek and Ball were abandoned by the
Court in Zobrest.262 The Zobrest Court had rejected the notion that the
placement of public employees in sectarian educational settings
"inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion. "263
The Agostini Court recognized that the Court in its Witters decision
had discredited the third assumption.264 The Agostini Court noted that,
in repudiating the third assumption that all government assistance that
directly aids religious school education is entirely invalid, the Witters
Court and the Zobrest Court distinguished governmental assistance
given to students who attend private sectarian schools from assistance
given directly to sectarian schools.265 The Agostini Court identified the
Witters Court as holding that the government's action is not
unconstitutional when the government gives public money to parents of
sectarian school students because the parents, not the government, make
25 Id. at 222.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 222-27.
2Q Id. at 222.
2 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)).
264 Id. at 224-26 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
488 (1986)).
2 Id. at 224-27 (discussing Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88, and Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-12).
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independent and private choices regarding where the public money will
be spent.266 The Court recognized that its jurisprudence indicated that
this form of indirect aid is no different from a public employee giving a
portion of the employee's paycheck to a religious organization.267 In both
instances, the government only indirectly aids religious institutions
through private choices of individuals, and therefore, the aid is not
invalid. 268
In the school-aid programs approved under recent Supreme Court
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has found significant the
fact that the aid was given to a broad class of beneficiaries and the
recipients eligible to receive the aid could attend a school of their
choosing whether public or private, sectarian or non-sectarian.269 Thus,
the Agostini Court expressly held that, "contrary to our conclusion in
Aguilar, placing full-time employees on parochial school campuses does
not as a matter of law have the impermissible effect of advancing
religion through indoctrination." 2
The Agostini Court also considered whether the criteria by which an
aid program identifies its beneficiaries had the effect of advancing
religion by creating a financial incentive to undertake religious
indoctrination. 271  The Court stated that "[t]his incentive is not
present... where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular
criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to
both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."272
The Court held that New York City's Title I program did not allocate
services on the basis of criteria that favor or disfavor religion and, thus,
the program did not give beneficiaries any incentive to modify their
religious beliefs or practices in order to obtain the services. 273
The Agostini Court then analyzed whether the program resulted in
an excessive entanglement between church and state, noting that "[n]ot
all entanglements... have the effect of advancing or inhibiting
Id. at 225-26 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
w Id. at 226 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 487). It is permissible for the State to give public
employees paychecks even if the government is aware that the money will end up in the
coffers of a religious institution. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88.
2' Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89.
m Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228-32.
2 Id.
2n Id. at 230-31.
2 Id. at 231.
73 Id.
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religion."274 The Court discounted the excessive entanglement analysis
used by the Aguilar Court.275 The Court held that, because the
unannounced monthly visits by public supervisors were not
demonstrated to be insufficient to prevent or to detect the inculcation of
religion by public employees and because the monitoring system was
not overly burdensome on the religious institutions, the program did not
cause an excessive entanglement.276
The Court held that the New York program did not run afoul of any
of the three primary criteria the Court now uses to determine whether
government aid has the primary effect of advancing religion: "it does not
result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference
to religion; or create an excessive entanglement." 2"7 The Court also held
that "a federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial
instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid
under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the
premises of sectarian schools by government employees pursuant to a
program containing safeguards such as those present [in this case]." 278
The Court further concluded that the carefully constrained program
could not reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of religion, thus
satisfying a separate consideration sometimes used in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 279
B. Federal Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in State Courts
Although the Court's recent trend of applying a less rigorous
standard in school-aid cases may suggest a willingness to uphold state-
274 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
Id. In discussing the Aguilar Court's excessive entanglement analysis, the Court stated:
[T]he Court's finding of "excessive" entanglement in Aguilar rested on
three grounds: (1) the program would require "pervasive monitoring
by public authorities" to ensure that Title I employees did not inculcate
religion; (2) the program required "administrative cooperation"
between the Board and parochial schools; and (3) the program might
increase the dangers of "political divisiveness."
Id. at 233 (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,413-14 (1985)).
The Court noted that the first of these considerations had been undermined and that the
last two of these considerations were insufficient by themselves to constitute an excessive
entanglement. Id. at 233-34.
276 Id. at 234.
2n Id.
2n Id. at 234-35.
29 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235.
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established school voucher programs that include sectarian schools, 28°
the U.S. Supreme Court has not determined whether school voucher
programs are constitutional. 281 The Supreme Courts in Wisconsin,
Arizona, and Ohio have, however, recently ruled that each state's
respective voucher-type program does not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.2m2
1. Wisconsin
In Jackson v. Benson,283 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
MPCP2 did not violate the Establishment Clause. Applying the Lemon
test,285 the court determined that the MPCP had the secular purpose of
providing greater educational opportunities for children from lower-
income families.2 6 The court held that, by granting parents choices
among public and private, sectarian and non-sectarian schools, the
MPCP did not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.W Further, the court concluded that the state superintendent's
minimal supervision of the participating religious schools did not create
excessive government entanglement.2 8 Having satisfied all three prongs
25) Roberson, supra note 252, at 862, 872. The Agostini decision is favorable to religious
students who desire to receive the same government benefits that are awarded to public
school students. Id. According to Nyquist, Mueller, and Witters, the proper analysis for
determining the validity of a school aid case appears to be neutrality. Fenton, supra note
19, at 663.
281 The U.S. Supreme Court has denied petitions for writ of certiorari in two cases seeking
to determine the constitutionality of voucher programs. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606
(Ariz.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 283 (1999), and Rhodes v. Killian, 120 S. Ct. 42 (1999); Jackson
v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
2 See infra Section mEIB.
- 578 N.W.2d 602, 611 (Wis. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
2S4 For a discussion of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, see supra Section II.B.3.c.i.
m For a discussion of the Lemon test, see supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
2m Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612. The legislature created the MPCP to offer educational
opportunities outside of the Milwaukee Public School system for students. Id. The court
also discussed the need for an educated population to have a stable community. Id. (citing
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,395 (1983)).
27 Id. at 612-19. The Jackson court analyzed numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases to decide
the second prong of Lemon. Id. The Jackson court decided to analyze the MPCP under the
recently adopted "neutrality" approach. Id. at 617. See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
222-23 (1997). First, eligibility for the MPCP is based on neutral secular criteria. Jackson,
578 N.W.2d at 617. Second, the court reasoned that the religious schools only receive
assistance because of the parents' private decisions. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618.
2m5 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619. Before the legislature enacted the MPCP, the state
superintendent monitored the quality of religious and non-sectarian education. Id. The
MPCP did not increase the superintendent's monitoring responsibilities. Id.
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of the Lemon test, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the MPCP
constitutional under the federal Establishment Clause.289
2. Arizona
In Kotterman v. Killian,29° the Arizona Supreme Court held that the
Arizona tax deduction program291 did not violate the Establishment
Clause.292 In reaching its holding, the Kotterman court relied primarily on
the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Mueller and Lemon.293 First, the
court held that the Arizona tax deduction had the secular purpose of
providing Arizona students with a quality education at schools of their
choice.294 Second, the court found that, by allowing parents to receive
tax credits for sending their children to sectarian or non-sectarian
schools, the primary effect of the Arizona statute was neither to advance
nor to inhibit religion.295 Third, the court determined that Arizona's
passive role in administering the credit program did not create excessive
government entanglement with religion.296  The court concluded,
therefore, that the Arizona program was constitutionally valid under the
federal Establishment Clause.297
M Id. at 620.
29 972 P.2d 606,616 (Ariz. 1999).
291 For a discussion of this Arizona statute, see supra Section lI.B.3.c.ii.
2 Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 616.
2 Id. at 611-16. For a discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman, see supra notes 195-203 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Mueller v. Allen, see supra notes 218-30 and
accompanying text.
294 Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 611-12. Since 1994, the Arizona legislature has expanded the
educational opportunities for Arizona students by establishing charter schools and non-
tuition public schools. Id.
2 5 Id. at 616. The Kotterman court analyzed the second prong of Lemon by using the three
step approach developed in Mueller. Id. at 612. First, the tax deduction must be one of
many offered by the state. Id. at 613. Besides the school tax credit, Arizona also provides a
credit for contributions made to assist the poor, a $200 credit for public school
extracurricular activities fees, and the ability to take the full amount of allowable
deductions under the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 616. Second, the tax deduction must
be available to a broad class of beneficiaries. Id. at 613. Arizona's tax credit is available for
all taxpayers, not just parents of school-age children. Id. Third, the credit must be directed
to the school as a result of private choices. Id. at 613. The Arizona taxpayers' decide
whether to make cash contributions to an STO. Id. at 614. Then the parents determine
which STO they will apply to for a student scholarship. Id. Therefore, religious schools
receive taxpayer contributions indirectly. Id.
296 Id. at 611-12 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,613 (1971)).
m Id.
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3. Ohio
In Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 298 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the
School Voucher Program 299 did not violate the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. The Goff court utilized the Lemon test," along
with subsequent U.S. Supreme Court Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, in reaching its holding.3° 1 The court found that the SVP
clearly served the secular legislative purpose of educating children
within the Cleveland City School District.3°2  The court further
determined that the SVP neither advanced nor inhibited religion because
students benefited whether they attended the qualifying public or
private, sectarian or non-sectarian schools.? Finally, the court
concluded that the SVP did not cause an excessive entanglement of
government with religion because the state provided the assistance to
the parents, not the religious schools.3 4 The Ohio Supreme Court held,
therefore, that the SVP did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.305
C. Requirements for a Valid Voucher Program Under the Federal Constitution
For a voucher program to be valid under the Establishment Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, it will have to withstand constitutional scrutiny
under the Lemon test.3° 6 First, the voucher program must demonstrate a
- 711 N.E.2d 203,211 (Ohio 1999).
29 For a review of the School Voucher Program, see supra Section II.B.3.c.iii.
3w For a discussion of the Lemon test, see supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
301 See Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 207-11.
Id. at 208.
= Id. at 210. In its analysis of section two of the Lemon test, the court examined the criteria
that registered private schools must follow in order to grant priority to students. Id. at 210.
The priorities were granted as follows: (1) previously enrolled students; (2) siblings of
previously enrolled students; (3) students living in the school district where the private
school is located; (4) "students whose parents are affiliated with any organization that
provides financial support to the school"; and (5) all other applicants. Id. (citing OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3313.977(A) (West 1999)). The court determined that priorities (1), (2), (3),
and (5) were both secular and neutral. Id. However, priority (4) favored religion by
providing parents with the incentive to modify their religious practices in order to receive a
school voucher. Id. Therefore, priority (4) was unconstitutional and had to be severed
from the rest of the statutory scheme. /d.
w4 Id. at 211.
3 Id.
" See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d
203 (Ohio 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 601 (Wis. 1998). See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In spite of its lack of favor with a majority of the current
Supreme Court justices, the Court has not overruled the use of the Lemon test. See Agostini
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secular purpose.307 Generally, if a voucher program promotes the
educational opportunities of students, it has a secular purpose.3°8
Second, the voucher program must not have the primary or principal
effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion.3 Several factors are key
to making this determination: the voucher program must be facially
neutral, not creating a preference for or against religion;310 it must be
directed toward a broad class of beneficiaries; 311 and, rather than
granting the aid to the schools, the state or local government should
grant the aid to parents who then may independently choose where to
direct the money.312 Third, the voucher system must not cause excessive
government entanglement with the religious institutions.313 A voucher
program that satisfies these requirements should withstand scrutiny
under Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
A state voucher program may also be subjected to challenge under
the state constitution.314  Because the U.S. Constitution and state
constitutions contain language relating to the establishment of religion
and the free exercise of religion, it is important to understand how the
federal and state provisions interrelate. Three principles govern the
interpretive relationship between the religion clauses in the federal and
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). For a discussion of the Lemon test, see supra notes 195-203
and accompanying text.
3 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983). The Supreme Court has been reluctant to invalidate a state statute using the first
prong of Lemon. Id. at 394. The Court will usually be able to find a secular purpose in the
state's legislation. /d. at 395. For instance, the secular purpose in Zobrest was to provide a
better educational experience for a deaf student by assigning him an interpreter. See
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3,10 (1993).
" Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395.
3w9 For a discussion of secular purpose, see supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
310 Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986). The
voucher program must not provide greater benefits for students enrolled in sectarian
institutions. Id.
311 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
312 CONTROVERSY, supra note 6, at 61. As soon as the state gives a voucher to parents to
redeem for their child's educational expenses, then that money no longer belongs to the
state. Id. The parents are then free to choose whether to send their child to a public or
private school. Id. If a parochial school receives the parent's voucher, it is because the
parent wants the child to be educated at that particular school. Id.; see also Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997).
313 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973); but
see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34 (including excessive entanglement in the second prong as
one of three undesirable effects to be avoided).
314 G. Alan Taff, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 78-79 (1989).
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state constitutions.315 First, federal law is supreme; therefore, all conflicts
between federal and state law are resolved in favor of federal law.316
Second, state courts must interpret federal law in accordance with U.S.
Supreme Court precedent. 317 Third, the U.S. Supreme Court will only
review state law that is inconsistent with federal law.318 These principles
allow state courts to interpret their constitutions independently from the
federal constitution.319
A. Programs Upheld Under State Constitutions
The Wisconsin, Arizona, and Ohio Supreme Courts have held that
the voucher programs in their respective states are valid under their state
constitutions. 320 Because the religion clauses in the Indiana Constitution
are similar to the religion clauses in the Wisconsin, Arizona, and Ohio
Constitutions,321 the analysis used by these state supreme courts under
their state constitutions is instructive regarding the interpretation of the
Indiana Constitution.322 All four constitutions establish that no public
money shall be directed toward a religious institution or seminary;323
thus, in order for a voucher program to include private, sectarian
schools, the religious institutions can only receive public funds
indirectly.324
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id. Besides interpreting federal law in accordance with U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
the state courts must also prefer federal law to state law. Id.
319 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See also Tarr, supra note 314, at 78-79. If a
state court's ruling is based on an adequate and independent state ground, that particular
holding is exempt from U.S. Supreme Court review. Id. at 79 (citing Kramer, State Court
Constitutional Decisionmaking: Supreme Court Review of Nonexplicit State Court Judgments,
1983 ANN. Smv. AM. LAW 277 and Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts; a Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1118
(1984)).
319 Tarr, supra note 314, at 79. The state court may decide to interpret the state's
constitution as requiring more, equal, or less separation of church and state than the federal
Constitution. Id.
1 For a discussion of the state supreme court decisions regarding the Wisconsin, Arizona,
and Ohio voucher programs, see infra Sections W.A.1-3.
321 To compare the religions clauses of the four constitutions, see infra notes 325, 336-38,
344,363, 367 and accompanying text.
M For a discussion of the Indiana Constitution's religion clauses pertaining to the
implementation of a voucher program, see infra Section 1V.C.
=23 See infra Section IV.C.
324 Id.
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1. Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
In Jackson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined whether the
MPCP violated Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which
provides that no public money shall benefit religious seminaries.325 As
the court had previously interpreted the religion provision of the
Wisconsin Constitution to require the same showing as the second prong
of the Lemon test,3 26 the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed the MPCP to
determine whether it had the primary or principal effect of advancing
religion.3v The court reasoned that the MPCP is facially neutral because
eligibility for program benefits is based on neutral, secular criteria that
neither favors nor disfavors religion.328 The court also reasoned that
program benefits were available to a broad class of beneficiaries because
schools, whether public or private, whether sectarian or non-sectarian,
could participate in the MPCP.329 Further, the court reasoned that state
assistance is indirect because the local government sends aid directly to
the parents of participating students, not to the religious institutions.330
M Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 619 (Wis. 1998). Article I, Section 18 of the
Wisconsin Constitution states:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or
interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any
preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.
Wis. CONST. art. L § 18.
M See State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 219 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Wis. 1974). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court interprets Article 1, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court cases that analyze the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. King v.
Village of Waunakee, 517 N.W.2d 671, 683 (Wis. 1994).
327 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 621. The Wisconsin Supreme Court states that the crucial
question is not whether religious institutions receive any benefit from a legislative
program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion. Id. (citations
omitted).
32 Id. at 617, 621. The Wisconsin Supreme Court looks to federal Establishment Clause
jurisprudence when interpreting the Art. I, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. See King v.
Village of Waunakee, 517 N.W.2d 671, 672 (Wis. 1994); State ex rel. Wisconsin Health
Facilities Auth. v. Lindner, 280 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Wis. 1979); State ex rel. Warren v.
Nusbaum, 198 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Wis. 1972); State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W.2d 790,
802 (Wis. 1969).
329 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 617,621.
3m Id. at 618-19, 621. With a variety of participating schools, the MPCP does not require
students to attend a religious school. Id. at 623. The student may only be required to
attend a religious school because of their parent's choice. Id. The "opt-out" provision also
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded therefore that the MPCP is
constitutionally valid because it does not have the primary effect of
advancing religion.331
2. Arizona Statute Section 43-1089
The Arizona Supreme Court in Kotterman considered whether the
legislatively-enacted program in Arizona, allowing taxpayers to
voluntarily contribute to the STO and providing a tax credit for that
contribution,33 2 violated the Arizona Constitution. 3 Specifically, the
court determined whether scholarships provided through the STOs to
qualified private school children constitute public aid to religious
instruction.3-4 The Arizona Supreme Court considered two provisions of
the Arizona Constitution which prohibited taxes from being laid and
public money3 from being appropriated to aid private or sectarian
schools, to fund religious instruction, or to support any religious
establishment. The court noted that the framers of the Arizona
Constitution supported tax exemptions for non-profit religious
institutions.337 In fact, the court recognized that Arizona's constitutional
exemption for churches in its taxing scheme has laid the foundation for
modem tax exemptions.338 The Kotterman court used the primary effects
prohibits religious schools from requiring student attendance at religious activities. Id. For
a discussion regarding MPCP criteria, see Section U.B.3.c.i.
331 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 623.
M See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1089 (1998).
M Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999)
M Id.
m "Public money" means revenue received from local, state, and federal governments
from fees, fines and taxes. BLAcK's LAW DICTONARY 1005 (6th ed. 1990).
m Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 617. Article 2, Section 12 of the Arizona Contitution states: "No
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment." ARIz. CONST. art.
II, § 12. Article 9, Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution states: "No tax shall be laid or
appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or
any public service corporation." ARIZ. CONsT. art. IX, § 10.
" Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 620. See ARIZ. CoNsr. art. IX, § 2 (allowing tax-exempt status for
churches). The Kotterman court reasoned that these exemptions suggest either. (1) that the
Framers did not believe the exemptions were direct grants of public money; or (2) that the
Framers did not intend the prohibition against public aid to religious institutions to be all-
encompassing. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 620.
= Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 621-23. "[Tlhe doctrine of separation of church and state does not
include the doctrine of total nonrecognition of the church by the state and of the state by
the church." Community Council v. Jordan, 432 P.2d 460, 463 (Ariz. 1967). The Community
Council Court stated:
The prohibitions against the use of public assets for religious purposes
were included in the Arizona Constitution to provide for the historical
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prong of the Lemon test in analyzing the validity of the Arizona statute.339
The court reasoned that the program did not violate Article II, Section 12,
prohibiting the appropriation of public money or property for religious
instruction or support of any religious establishment, because the public
aid only indirectly flowed to religious schools. 4  The court also
reasoned that the program did not violate Article IX, Section 10,
prohibiting taxation or appropriation of public money made in aid of
private or sectarian schools, because the tax credit is not an
appropriation of public funds.3 1 The court held that the tax credit and
scholarship programs do not violate the Arizona Constitution's religion
clauses.m
3. Ohio School Voucher Program
In Goff, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the SVP, which
provides scholarship funds to students who may use the money to
attend public or private schools, violated the Ohio Constitution.34 The
court noted that Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution, providing
that no person shall be compelled to support a place of worship against
his consent,3" has been interpreted to be the approximate equivalent of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
doctrine of separation of church and state, the thrust of which was to
insure that there would be. no state supported religious institutions
thus precluding governmental preference and favoritism of one or
more churches.
Id.
m Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 612.
34 Id. The taxpayers choose whether to make cash contributions to the participating STO's.
Id. at 614. The families receiving assistance decide which school to send their children to.
Id. Then the public aid flows to the religious school as a result of independent, not
government, choices. Id.
31 Id. at 620. The Arizona statute does not impose any taxes. Id. at 621. Instead, the statute
reduces a taxpayers tax liability if he or she chooses to contribute to the STO. Id. If a
taxpayer chooses not to contribute to the STO, the statute does not provide for a penalty for
this choice. Id.
3G Id. The Kotterman court also looked to the framer's intent to analyze this case. Id. at 621-
23. The court reasoned that the framers valued the educational system and created the
Arizona Constitution to change with economic conditions. Id. at 623. The economic
conditions of today's society show a nation-wide call for school reform. Id. (citing Jo Ann
Bodemer, Note, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional Lemon-Aid from the
Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273,275-77 (1996)).
W Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203,211 (Ohio 1999).
3" Id. Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution states, "No person shall be compelled to
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his
consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
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Constitution.345 The court adopted the three-part Lemon test to
determine whether the SVP establishes religion,346 clarifing that it
adopted the Lemon test not because it was the federal constitutional
standard, but instead because the Lemon test provided a reasonable and
logical method of resolving this state constitutional question.347 The
court reiterated its federal constitutional analysis of the SVP under the
Lemon test 4 and reached the same conclusion, reasoning that the
legislature did not have the impermissible purpose of advancing or
inhibiting religion when it enacted the SVP and that the SVP does not
cause the excessive entanglement of the government and religion.349 The
court therefore held that the SVP did not violate the Ohio Constitution.3 °
B. An Invalid Program Under the Vermont State Constitution
In Chittenden Town School District v. Vermont Department of
Education,351  the Vermont Supreme Court considered a state
constitutional challenge brought by the Department of Education against
a local school district's provision of education to local high school
students. Because Chittenden, Vermont, did not maintain a public high
school to educate its ninety-five students who were in grades nine
through twelve, the Chittenden Town School District devised a program
that would pay the tuition costs of these students so that these students
could attend nearby public high schools or approved independent
schools, including sectarian schools.352 Instead of sending the tuition
Ws Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 211 (citing State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66, 67 (Ohio 1980)
and Southern Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Comm., 676 F. Supp. 799, 808 (S.D. Ohio.
1987)).
346 Id.
347 Id. The Ohio Supreme Court also reserved the right to adopt a different constitutional
standard that is pursuant to the Ohio Constitution in deciding future religious issues. Id. at
212. The court reserved this right so that it would not be "irreversibly tie[d]" to the Lemon-
Agostini analysis. /d.
3a For a discussion of the court's federal analysis, see supra Sec. M.B.3.
3 Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 212.
3mo Id. The Ohio Supreme Court also discussed whether the School Voucher Program
violated Article 6, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. Id. Article 6, Section 2 states "[N]o
religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part
of the school funds of this state." OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. The court explained that the
School Voucher Program does not allow any public money to flow directly from the state
to a sectarian school. Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 212. Further, the only way that a sectarian school
receives money originating in the School Voucher Program is by the independent decisions
of families to direct their scholarships to sectarian schools. Id. Therefore, the School
Voucher Program does not violate Article 6, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. Id.
-1 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999).
3s Id. at 542. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 822 (1989).
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money to the parents, however, the school district sent the money
directly to the school that the parents had selected for their children. 3- 3
One of the approved schools was a sectarian school operated under the
authority of the Roman Catholic Diocese; a school that incorporated
prayer and religious studies into its educational curriculum.3 4 In 1996,
fifteen students from Chittenden attended this school.5
The Department of Education challenged Chittenden's program
under the Compelled Support Clause of the Vermont Constitution.356 In
analyzing the constitutionality of the Chittenden program, the Vermont
Supreme Court considered prior case law, the text of the constitutional
provision, the historical context surrounding the adoption of the
Compelled Support Clause, and decisions of other state courts.357 The
court concluded that the Chittenden program violated the Compelled
Support Clause because the program lacked restrictions to prevent the
use of public money to fund sectarian education.3s5
3s3 Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 542. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 822(a)(1), 824(b).
64 Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 542.
3s Id. at 543.
35 Id. The Compelled Support Clause of the Vermont Constitution provides:
[All [persons] have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding, as in their opinion shall be regulated by the word of
God; and that no [person] ought, or of right can be compelled to attend
any religious worship, or erect, or support any place of worship, or
maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of... conscience, nor
can any [person] who professes the Protestant religion be justly
deprived or abridged of any civil right, as a citizen, on account of
religious sentiment, or peculiar mode of religious worship, and that no
authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power
whatsoever, that shall, in any case, interfere with, or in any manner
control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious
worship: nevertheless, every sect or denomination of people ought to
observe the Sabbath, or the Lord's day, and keep up and support some
sort of religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to
the revealed will of God.
VT. CONsT. ch. L art. 3.
B7 See Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 539.
3 Id. at 562. The court declined to provide a solution for a tuition-payment scheme that
would pass muster under the Vermont Constitution. Id.
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C. Indiana
In 1816, delegates from the Indiana territory convened in Corydon,
Indiana, to draft Indiana's original constitution and to seek statehood. 359
The delegates gathered copies of existing constitutions and hurriedly
adapted them to create Indiana's first constitution.3 ° The original
constitution, however, was sharply criticized throughout the state; so,
delegates assembled a second time to draft another constitution.361 In
1850, one hundred and fifty-four delegates convened the Constitutional
Convention of 1850-51 and drafted a second constitution for Indiana,
which is presently the Constitution of the State of Indiana. 362
Two religion clauses under the Indiana Constitution are particularly
relevant to the legal questions presented by school vouchers, Article I,
Section 4 and Article I, Section 6.3 Article L Section 4 of the Indiana
3% Honorable Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the Law: Constitutional Entitlement Versus
Judicial Interpretation, 33 VAL U. L REv. 449, 456 (1999). The first constitution took only
eighteen working days to draft. Id.
W0 John D. Barnhart, Sources of Indiana's First Constitution, 39 INDIANA MAG. HisT. 55 (1943).
Indiana's first constitution closely resembles the Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee Constitutions. Id.
361 Rucker, supra note 359, at 457.
W6 Brent E. Dickson et al., Lawyers and Judges as Framers of Indiana's 1851 Constitution, 30
IND. L. REV. 397 (1997). The legal profession greatly influenced the framing of the Indiana
Constitution. Id. at 398. Among the delegates, fifty-six out of one hundred and fifty-four
men had either studied law, become attorneys, or were, or in the future would be, judges.
Id. The original constitution has been modified by several amendments. Id. However,
these changes have not significantly affected the basic framework of the document
establishing the structure of Indiana's legal and government system. Id.
3 The delegates only placed one religion clause within the first constitution. Article I, §3
(1816). The original religion clause stated:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences; That
no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of
worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent; That no
human authority can, in any case, whatever, control or interfere with
the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given to
any religious Societies, or modes of worship; and no religious test shall
be required as a qualification to any office of trust or profit.
IND. CONSr'. of 1816, art. L § 3.
The delegates adapted this religion clause from the Kentucky and Ohio constitutions. The
Kentucky religion clause read:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that
no man of right can be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place
of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no
human authority can in any case whatever control or interfere with the
Smith: Educational Vouchers in Indiana? – Considering the Federal and St
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Constitution states that "no preference shall be given, by law, to any
creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no man shall be
compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry, against his consent."3 4  Article I, Section 6
provides that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the
benefit of any religious or theological institution."6 Although Indiana
rights of conscience; and that no preference shall be given by law to
any religious societies or modes of worship.
KY. CoNsT. of 1792, art. XII, § 3.
The Indiana constitutional framers also borrowed a portion of the original religion clause
from the Ohio Constitution. Rucker, supra note 359, at 456. The relevant portion of the
Ohio Constitution reads "and no religious test shall be required, as a qualification to any
office of trust or profit." OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3. The second constitution
originally contained one religion clause. CHARLES KEm"tEBOROUGH, CONSTrUTiON
MAKING IN INDIANA 296 (photo. reprint 1971) (1916). The Committee on Revision divided
the original religion clause into five sections, currently known as Sections 2,3,4,5, and 6 of
Article I. Id. These sections of the Indiana Constitution are equivalent to the federal
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
,4 IND. CONST. art. I, § 4.
3"IND. CONST. art. I, § 6. See also State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N.E.2d 256, 263 (Ind.
1940). If any public official knowingly violates these provisions by paying money from the
public treasury to a religious institution, then that official is required to reimburse the
treasury for all amounts paid. Id. Most state constitutions prohibit direct aid to religious
schools. See ALA. CoNST. art. XIV, § 263 ("No money raised for the support of the public
schools shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian or denominational
school."); ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("No money shall be paid from public funds for the
direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution."); ARIZ. CONST. art.
II, § 12 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment."); ARK.
CONST. art. XIV, § 2 ("No money or property belonging to the public school funds, or to
this State for the benefit of schools or universities, shall ever be used for any other than for
the respective purposes to which it belongs."); CAL CONST. art. IX, § 8 ("No public money
shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or denominational school.");
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 ("Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town,
township, school district or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or
pay from any public fund or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian
society, or for any sectarian purpose .... "); DEL CONST. art. X, § 3 ("No portion of any
fund now existing or which may hereafter be appropriated, or raised by tax, for
educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of any sectarian,
church or denominational school."); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 ("Neither the legislature nor
any city... shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys...
to help support or sustain any school, academy... controlled by any church, sectarian, or
religious denomination."); ILL. COwsT. art. I, § 3 ("Neither the General Assembly nor any
county, city... shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund ... to help
support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university... controlled by any
church or sectarian denomination."); Ky. CONsT. § 189 ("No portion of any fund or tax now
existing, or that may hereafter be raised or levied for educational purposes, shall be
appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of, any church, sectarian or denominational school.");
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13 ("No appropriation of public funds shall be made to any private or
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case law is not fully developed regarding the requirements of these two
religion clauses, decisions by two Indiana appellate courts have
interpreted both of these provisions and are instructive regarding tuition
vouchers in Indiana.36
In 1940, the Indiana Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd,3 7
held that the school board's decision to grant public aid to Roman
Catholic parochial schools when it paid teachers their salaries directly
violated neither Article I, Section 4 nor Article I, Section 6 of the Indiana
Constitution.3"  The facts that prompted the school board's decision
sectarian schools."); MICH. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 2 ("No public monies or property shall be
appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political
subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private,
denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary school.");
MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 2 ("In no case shall any public money or property be appropriated
or used for the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any
particular Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taught."); Miss. CONST. art.
8, § 208 ("[Njor shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of any sectarian
school."); Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8 ("Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city,
town.., shall ever make an appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever,
anything... to help to support or sustain any private or public school academy, seminary,
college, university, or other institution of learning controlled by any religious creed,
church, or sectarian denomination."); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6 ("The legislature, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect
appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other
property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary,
college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part
by any church, sect, or denomination."); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11 ("The state shall not
accept money or property to be used for sectarian purposes."); N.H. CONST. Pt. 2, art. 83
("[N]o money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools
or institutions of any religious sect or denomination."); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 ("Neither
the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit or any public money,
or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other
than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part
under the control or direction of any religious denomination..."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 15
("No money raised for the support of the public schools of the Commonwealth shall be
appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school."); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4
("No money shall be paid from public funds nor shall the credit of the State or any of its
political subdivisions be used for the direct benefit of any religious or other private
educational institution."); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 13 ("Neither the Legislature nor any
county, city.., shall make any appropriation to aid in the support of any school, seminary,
academy, college, university or other institution, controlled in whole, or in part, by any
church sect or denomination whatever."); WIs. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("[Njor shall any money
be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious or theological seminaries.").
36 See State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N.E.2d 256 (Ind. 1940); Center Township v. Coe, 572
N.E.2d 1350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
- 28 N.E.2d 256 (Ind. 1940).
W Id. at 264.
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were relevant to the court's holding. The effects of economic depression
in the 1930's caused parochial schools in the City of Vincennes to lack
operating funds, and school officials feared that the schools would have
to be closed. 69 The Board of School Trustees, a city administrative body,
voted to assume both the administrative and the instructional
obligations for parochial school children within the city limits, based on
an understanding that the city would not assume any existing,
outstanding, or future financial obligations for the maintenance,
operation, or capital outlay costs incurred by the Catholic Parochial
Schools. 370 The resolution, which applied to students enrolled in
kindergarten through the sixth grade in certain parochial schools,
declared these parochial schools part of the public school system and
therefore subject to all regulations of the public school system.3 71
Vincennes continued to use the former parochial school building at no
rental cost to the city, and none of the religious symbols were removed
from the classrooms.372 The Superintendent of the Vincennes Public
Schools hired teachers recommended by Roman Catholic colleges.373 The
Board required these teachers, all of whom were certified to teach within
the State of Indiana, to teach only secular material during school
hours.374 The issue presented on appeal by the taxpayers of Vincennes
was whether the salary payments made by the Board of School Trustees
to the parochial school teachers violated the Indiana Constitution375
The Court found that the teachers were employees of the School City
of Vincennes and, therefore, the Board was obligated to pay the teachers
for their services.376 The court reasoned that, based on the employment
contracts between the teachers and the Board, the salaries did not
constitute assistance to the parochial schools or to the Roman Catholic
36 Id. at 260. On July 28, 1933, a group of priests from the Roman Catholic Parishes
informed the Board of School Trustees for the School City of Vincennes that the church
operated schools would not be run during the school year of 1935-36. Id. The Parish
Committee requested that the trustees provide educational facilities for the eight hundred
students that would be affected by the school closing. Id.
M0 Id. at 260.
37 Id. The parochial schools that the resolution applied to were St. Francis Xavier School,
Sacred Heart School, and the St. John School. Id.
3n Boyd, 28 N.E.2d at 261.
M3' Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 263-64. The appellants, taxpayers, argued that the schools continued to be
parochial schools under the Roman Catholic church's control and payments made to the
teachers was a pretext for making donations to the church. Id.
376 Id. at 261.
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Church.377 Therefore, the decision of the Board did not violate the
Indiana Constitution by making any contributions to the church
directly.378
In 1991, the Indiana Court of Appeals in Center Township v. Coe37
held that a homeless shelter's requirement of church attendance violated
the Indiana Constitution.8 The Court of Appeals reasoned that
conditioning a statutory benefit on attending religious programs violates
a person's constitutional rights.3 1 Specifically, a requirement to attend
or support worship against a person's will clearly violates Article I,
Section 4 of Indiana's Constitution.3 u The court also held that, according
to Boyd, direct payments to the religious mission violated Article I,
Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution.-3 8 The Court reasoned that the
Trustee of Center Township made no effort to separate the statutory
benefits from the missions' sectarian purpose. 4 Although the Court of
Appeals held that the Trustee violated Article I, Sections 4 and 6, the
Court noted that a religious mission can receive government funding if
the mission does not require the shelter inhabitants to attend religious
services.3 5
3" Boyd, 28 N.E.2d at 261.
3n Id.
- 572 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
M Id. at 1359. The court cited to provisions in the Indiana Code indicating that the Trustee
of Center Township was obligated to provide emergency shelter assistance. IND. CODE
§§ 12-2-1-10(b), 12-2-1-20(a) (1988) (repealed 1992). To meet the statutory obligation, the
Trustee offered two types of shelter. permanent housing through a lease agreement and
shelter in a religious mission. Coe, 572 N.E.2d at 1359. Any person in need of emergency
shelter was referred directly to the religious mission, no other alternatives were available.
Id. One requirement to receive shelter at the mission was to attend religious services. Id.
The Trustee, aware of this requirement, nevertheless, continued to reimburse the religious
mission for its shelter services. Id.
391 Coe, 572 N.E.2d at 1360. The government cannot force a person to choose between
participating in a public program and exercising their constitutional rights. Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,716 (1981).
m Coe, 572 N.E.2d at 1360. Similar to requiring a person to attend a religious service, a
professor's requirement of having students listen to Bible readings at the beginning of class
violates the students' constitutional rights. Lynch v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
378 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
M Coe, 572 N.E.2d at 1360. The Coe court contrasted the payment of public funds to the
religious mission with the situation in Boyd. Id. In Boyd, the Indiana Supreme Court held
that the schools were public and therefore no public money would benefit the religious
institution. Id. However, in Coe, the money went directly to the religious mission and
furthering its sectarian purposes; therefore, it was in violation of Article I, Section 6. Id.
3" Id. at 1360.
=s Id.
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D. Application of the Indiana Constitution to Voucher Programs
Given the "no aid" language found within most state
constitutionsm6 indirect aid to parochial schools appears to be
constitutionally suspect.38  Despite the constitutional language,
however, some state courts have upheld indirect aid to private sectarian
schools.-3  These challenged programs have withstood state
constitutional scrutiny because the purpose of the indirect aid was to
benefit the child, not the parochial school.m9
Despite the "no-aid" language within the Indiana Constitution, a
voucher program within the State of Indiana may be constitutionally
valid.390 Boyd and Coe establish two essential requirements for a valid
voucher system. 391 First, the proposed voucher system would have to
grant assistance directly to the students.39 Second, after the students
direct the money to their choice parochial school, the parochial school
cannot require the students to attend that school's religious activities. 393
A voucher system bearing these characteristics, along with the
3w For a list of state constitutions that contain this "no aid" language, see supra note 365.
3v Tarr, supra note 314, at 96.
8 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606
(Ariz. 1999). Cf. Visser v. Nooksack Valley Sch. Dist., 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949) (holding
that bus transportation to and from a sectarian school violated the provision of the
Washington Constitution that stated, "No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment."); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533, 535 (Or. 1961)
(holding that free textbooks to parochial schools violates the provision of the Oregon
Constitution that stated, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of
any [religious], or theological institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for the
payment of any [religious] services in either house of the Legislative Assembly.").
38 Tarr, supra note 314, at 97-98. In Cochran, the U.S. Supreme Court first introduced this
"child-benefit" theory. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The
Court reasoned that the state may assist lower-income parochial school students when
general aid to the parochial school would otherwise be unconstitutional. Id.
390 See State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N.E.2d 256, 264 (Ind. 1940); Center Township v. Coe,
572 N.E.2d 1350, 1360 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). See also Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112 (1857). In
Voglesong, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld Indiana's Sunday closing law, even though
the legislature established the law to protect the Sabbath. Id. at 113-14. Thus, the court
acknowledged religion could be recognized by the state. Id.
31 See Boyd, 28 N.E.2d at 264; Coe, 572 N.E.2d at 1360.
392 See Boyd, 28 N.E.2d at 264. In Boyd, the city of Vincennes provided assistance to the
parochial school teachers. Id. The Court found this type of aid constitutional because it did
not directly nor indirectly benefit the religious institution. Id.
m See Coe, 572 N.E.2d at 1360.
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requirements under the federal constitution, would neither encourage 394
nor benefit religion.395
V. PROPOSED STATUTORY VOUCHER PROGRAM
A. The Indiana Constitution
The framers of the Indiana Constitution considered learning and
knowledge to be essential to the govenance, freedom, and well-being of
the people of Indiana. 3% Thus, they delegated the responsibility of
improving the educational system to the General Assembly.39 Under its
plenary power over the public school system, the General Assembly has
enacted a statute from which all public school boards derive their
authority.398 Local public school boards may only exercise those powers
expressly granted under the statute.39 Because the power over the
3% Article I, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits legislation that encourages
people to support one religious belief while discouraging support of another. Robert
Twomley, Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 IND. L.J. 211, 222 (1945). However, Section 4 does not
prohibit legislation that provides for the social well-being of citizens. Id.
3" Article 1, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution reads, "No money shall be drawn from
the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution." IND. CONST. art. I,
§ 6. The question of aid to parochial schools through a voucher program can be analogized
to the following situation. If the Indiana Division of Public Health provided medicine to
private or denominational institutions to treat inmates, this action would violate section 6.
Twomley, supra note 394, at 223. However, if the Indiana Division of Public Health
provided the drugs directly to the inmates, no constitutional violation would occur. Id.
Similarly, if the state provided monetary assistance directly to the parochial schools, the
State would violate the Indiana Constitution. However, if the State gave the vouchers to
parents, the voucher program would pass constitutional muster.
3% IND. CONSTr. art. VIII, § 1. "Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a
community, being essential to the preservation of a free government...." Id.
w Id. "[i1t shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means,
moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a
general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge,
and equally open to all." Id.
ms The General Assembly has devoted Indiana Code Title 20 to education and Title 21 to
education finance. IND. CODE tits. 20 & 21 (West 1995). It established the Indiana State
Board of Education and the requirements for membership. IND. CODE § 20-1-1-1 (West
1995). See also State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 23 N.E. 946, 947-48 (Ind. 1890). As Judge
Cooley stated, "to what degree the legislature shall provide for the education of the people
at the cost of the state, or of its municipalities, is a question which, except as regulated by
the constitution, addresses itself to the legislative judgment exclusively." Id. at 948. See also
Stone v. Fritts, 82 N.E. 792 (Ind. 1907). The legislature will establish and regulate the public
schools. Id. at 794.
39 Haworth, 23 N.E. at 948. See also Gruber v. State ex rel. Welliver, 148 N.E. 481 (Ind. 1925).
The courts and the local authorities must respect the General Assembly's decisions in
providing for children's education, unless the legislature's decision contradicts the Indiana
Constitution. Id. at 485.
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public schools is legislative, the General Assembly is not precluded from
attempting new programs with the intent of improving education." A
school voucher program may provide the General Assembly with a
legislative option to improve the quality of education provided to
Indiana students and to improve their performance. In creating a
voucher program, the General Assembly must develop a general law
that applies in the same manner to all parts of Indiana where similar
operating conditions exist.401 According to the Indiana Constitution, the
General Assembly shall only pass general laws, rather than special or
local laws,402 that can operate throughout the state.403 Although the
general law does not need to be uniform, it must operate throughout the
state in a similar manner where the same conditions and circumstances
exist.4° Therefore, the voucher program must be available to each school
district. The Superintendent of each local school district would then
choose whether to participate in the program.
Any program enacted by the General Assembly must be able to
withstand scrutiny under both the U.S. Constitution and the Indiana
Constitution. The following proposed voucher program provides
Indiana's most disadvantaged students the opportunity to attend quality
schools that they could not afford, thus benefiting the students. This
proposed voucher program would be defensible under both the U.S.
Constitution and the Indiana Constitution.
4oo Gruber, 148 N.E. at 485. "To deny the power to change, is to affirm that progress is
impossible, and that we must move forever 'in the dim footsteps of antiquity.'" Id.
-' IND. CoNST. art. IV, § 23. See generally Wayne Township v. Brown, 186 N.E. 841 (Ind.
1933).
4 A "special law" is one made for an individual case, or "for less than a class requiring
laws appropriate to its particular condition or one relating to particular persons or things of
a class." Perry Civil Township v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 51 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind.
1943).
4m Article IV, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution provides a list of circumstances in
which the General Assembly shall not pass special or local laws. IND. CONST. art. V, § 22.
Although a proposed voucher program would not fall under the requirements of Section
22, Article IV, Section 23 applies. Article IV, Section 23 states: In all cases enumerated in
the preceding section [Art. IV, § 221, and in all other cases where a general law can be made
applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform-operation throughout the state." IND.
CONS. art. IV, § 23.
404 See State ex rel. Todd v. Hatcher, 301 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); Pennsylvania Co.
v. State, 41 N.E. 937 (Ind. 1895).
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B. The Proposed Voucher Program40
(1) The Indiana Board of Education 6 shall authorize the development
and implementation of the voucher system.
(2) The Superintendent of the local public school system shall establish
a voucher program for that school district. The program shall
provide vouchers for the educational expenses of qualifled students
at a participating schools.
(a) For the purposes of this section, a "qualified student" is
one who meets all of thefollowing criteria:
(i) The student's family has a total income that does
not exceed an amount that is equal to 1.75 times
the federal poverty level. The federal office of
management and budget determines the criteria
for the poverty level annually.
(ii) In the previous school year, the student has not
yet entered kindergarten, was enrolled in
kindergarten through fifth grade at either an
Indiana public school or a local private school, or
was a past recipient of a voucher.
(b) For the purposes of this section, a "participating school"
must meet all of thefollowing criteria:
(i) The private school must notify the local public
school Superintendent of its intent to participate
in the program. The school must give notice
before June 1st of the previous school year.
(ii) The private school is a non-governmental
primary or secondary school in Indiana.
4s This model voucher program is derived from the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1998), the Cleveland Pilot Project Scholarship Program,
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.975 (West 1996), and the Arizona Credit for Contributions to
School Tuition Organizations Program, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (West 1998).
4 According to Indiana law, "board" refers to "the state board of education" established
by the Indiana Code. See IND. CODE § 20-1-1.1-1 (West 1995).
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(iii) The private school must meet all health4's and
safety" codes that apply to the local public
school system, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.409
(iv) The private school must also satisfy all of the
requirements prescribed by law for Indiana
private schools.410
(c) No more than twenty percent of the school district's
membership may attend private sectarian schools under
this voucher program.
Commentary
This proposed voucher program represents one possible step to
improve the educational system in Indiana. The Superintendent of the
local public school system would establish the voucher program based
on the authority granted by the General Assembly. The Superintendent
would then provide vouchers to qualified students to cover their
educational expenses. The qualification requirements under this
proposed voucher program are fairly stringent. The student must be
able to meet all of the criteria established in section (1)(a) in order to
qualify for the voucher. The program only offers vouchers to students
from lower-income families because these students would ordinarily not
have the means to attend a school of their choice. Thus, the voucher
program provides students from lower-income families more
educational choices, including private sectarian and non-sectarian
schools. Also, in the previous school year, the student must have been
enrolled in kindergarten through the fifth grade at either an Indiana
public school or a local private school or must not have yet entered
kindergarten upon applying. The purpose of this qualification is to ease
the administrative process in implementing the program. By only
issuing vouchers to elementary-aged school students, the administration
will be able to expand the number of students gradually and to run the
program more efficiently. Because students may renew the vouchers
- IND. CODE § 20-8.1-7-1 to § 20-8.1-7-21 (West 1995).
- IND. CODE § 20-8.1-8-1 to § 20-8.1-8-2 (West 1995).
4- 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1997). "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Id.
410 IND. CODE § 20-1-19-1 to § 20-1-19-24 (West 1999).
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annually, from an early age, students will have the opportunity to
choose and attend the school of their choice throughout their education.
The participating schools must comply with all of the criteria
established in section (2)(b). This criterion is also applicable to the public
schools within the State of Indiana. By complying with these laws, the
participating schools will demonstrate to the Superintendent that the
school provides a safe, healthy, and nurturing environment for Indiana
students.
(3) The Superintendent4' shall be responsible for the overall
development, implementation, and monitoring of the school
voucher system.
(a) The Superintendent shall establish an application process
and deadline for accepting applications. Qualified
students or the students' parents412 must complete an
application, indicating the school that the student prefers
to attend.
(b) The qualified student or the student's parent will send the
application to the requested participating school. The
Superintendent will ensure that the schools do not
discriminate against students. Participating schools may
require students to complete the schools' application
procedures and may select students consistent with the
schools' standard admissions policy. If more students
qualify for admission in a participating school than the
school can accept, the Superintendent shall use a lottery
system to select from among the qualified applicants. If
an applicant's siblings are currently attending that
411 According to Indiana law, "superintendent" means "the chief administrative officer of a
school corporation generally referred to as the superintendent of schools, except that, in the
case of a township school, the term refers to the county superintendent of schools." IND.
CODE § 20-8.1-1-4 (West 1995).
412 According to Indiana law, "parent" is defined as:
[T]he natural, or in the case of adoption, the adopting father or mother
of a child; or where custody of child has been awarded in a court
proceeding to someone other than the mother or father, the court
appointed guardian or custodian of the child; or where the parents of a
child are divorced, the term 'parent' means the parent to whom the
divorce decree or modification awards custody or control with respect
to a right or obligation under this article.
IND. CODE § 20-8.1-1-3 (West 1995).
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school, the private school may give preference to that
applicant.
(c) Within two months of receiving the application, the
participating school will notify the student in writing of
his or her acceptance. However, if the student is not
chosen to participate due to lack of space at the requested
school, the student may resubmit the application to
another participating school.
(d) In each year of the program, only qualified students, who
have not entered kindergarten or were enrolled in
kindergarten through fifth grade in the previous year,
may apply for an initial voucher. Once a student has
received a voucher, the student may renew the voucher at
the end of each school year until the student completes the
twelfth grade.
Commentary
The application process seeks to minimize the state's administrative
role within the voucher program. The students or their parents apply to
the participating school. Within two months, the participating school
must notify the parents of the student's acceptance. The Superintendent
only ensures that the selection process operates effectively and will not
discriminate against students. Because the Superintendent's role in
administering the voucher program is minimal, no excessive
entanglement between the church and the state should occur.
(4) Once the student or the student's parents are informed of the
student's acceptance, the student must be enrolled in the
participating school. The parent must then send proof of
enrollment to the Superintendent.
(5) After the Superintendent receives the student's proof of
enrollment, the Superintendent will send a voucher to the qualified
student's parent. The voucher will be equal to the private school's
per pupil operating cost for educational expenses or the amount
that the State provides to educate each public school pupil in that
district, whichever is lower. The parent will endorse the check and
forward it to the participating school.
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Commentary
The Establishment Clause and the Indiana Constitution prohibit the
State from directly granting public money to private sectarian schools.
In order to create a constitutionally valid voucher program, public
assistance would only flow to a private school indirectly. This model
voucher program demonstrates how the process of gaining indirect aid
occurs. Under the program, the Superintendent would send a voucher
directly to the student's parents upon receipt of a student's proof of
enrollment. The parents would then forward the voucher to the
participating school. Thus, the parents would decide to grant public
money to the private schools, and the private school would only receive
the public money indirectly.
(6) The Superintendent shall monitor the performance of the qualified
students attending each participating school. If the
Superintendent determines that the participating school is not
meeting a standard set forth in (2)(b) of this section, the school will
be ineligible to participate in the program during the following
school year.
Commentary
To ensure that the voucher program benefits students, the
Superintendent shall monitor the students' progress. While this form of
governmental supervision may appear to create excessive entanglement
between the church and state, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed this
type of evaluation process. Under Indiana law, the Superintendent
already has the power to enter the private schools for administrative
matters. The voucher program's monitoring system reinforces the
Superintendent's purpose of ensuring quality education and
performance within the school district.
(7) If a qualified student wishes not to participate in the school's
religious activities or programming, the student's parent(s) shall
submit a letter to the student's teacher or participating school
principal requesting that the student be exempt from attending
such activities. The participating school shall not require these
students to attend religious activities.
Commentary
The Indiana Constitution prohibits the government from compelling
any person "to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to
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maintain any ministry, against his consent." 413 By placing an "opt-out"
provision within the voucher program, the General Assembly would not
be compelling students to worship. The students attending private
sectarian schools would have the opportunity to either support or be
excused from religious activities. This provision would allow students
to receive a private school education without being compelled to
worship.
VI. CONCLUSION
The poor academic performance by Indiana students has received
considerable attention by the media and has been the focus of much
debate and discussion. One potential solution to some of the problems is
for the General Assembly to enact legislation providing for school
voucher programs in Indiana. While school voucher programs may
provide a viable solution, a voucher system raises many concerns and
presents numerous federal and state constitutional issues that will shape
the nature and function of any proposed voucher system. This Note has
proposed a model statute that would create a voucher system, would
address some of the problems in education, the needs of children, and
the desires of parents, and would satisfy the requirements of the federal
and state constitutions.
Jennifer Lynn Smith*
413 IND. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
. I wish to thank Professor Rosalie B. Levinson for her valuable critiques and suggestions.
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